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Abstract 
Set against the backdrop of Chapter 11 proceedings in the United States, a 
specification of Cox’s proportional hazards model proposed by Partington, Stevenson, 
Russel and Torbey (2001) was examined for its stability over time. Faced with 
findings of instability consistent with those of Wong, Partington, Stevenson and 
Torbey (2007), the model was respecified to only include two firm-specific covariates 
(capturing firm size and earnings) and a time-dependent market-wide covariate. A 
‘calendar-time model’ was then introduced to enable analysis of the firm-specific 
covariates in abstraction from the systematic effects of time. With such effects 
controlled for, the suggestion was made that any remnant instability in the model was 
a result of non-systematic factors reflecting the changing nature of firms which filed 
for Chapter 11 protection during the period examined. 
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1. Introduction 
 
The phenomenon of corporate bankruptcy has long intrigued the academic world, as 
much as it has those corporations who have been so affected by it. Just as academics 
and practitioners have longed to understand how companies are built and sustained, 
they have watched in wonder as those same companies fall. For decades, beginning 
with the works of Altman (1968) and Ohlson (1980), the wealth of literature in this 
field has sought, not only to understand why firms fail, but to be ready to predict the 
next failure. For a large number of firms, however, ‘bankruptcy’ is by no means the 
end of the line. What happens to those firms once they do become bankrupt? For 
many, this poses a far more interesting question, and much of their attention has been 
focused on the experience in the United States (US). 
From 1978, financially distressed corporations in the US have had the option of filing 
for protection against their creditors under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code. Also 
known as ‘reorganisation bankruptcy’, Chapter 11 grants temporary relief to firms 
from their debt obligations and provides for the supervision of their reorganisation 
and possible rehabilitation, offering distressed firms an alternative to the direct 
liquidation of assets under Chapter 7 of the Bankruptcy Code. Though for some, 
liquidation is the path to which Chapter 11 eventually leads, for those firms whose 
value as a going concern exceeds that of its liquidated assets, the Chapter 11 process 
has some economic appeal. In the fiscal year to September 2006 alone, there were 
6,003 Chapter 11 filings of which 5,345 were by businesses1. The Chapter 11 
phenomenon is very much a part of the US corporate fabric. 
White (1989) is often cited as the leading authority on the conduct of Chapter 11 
proceedings and offers an insight into the complexity of this process. Creditors and 
shareholders enter negotiations as a reorganisation plan is constructed and put before 
a bankruptcy court for confirmation, leading to a number of possible outcomes for the 
distressed firm: its successful reorganisation and its emergence as an independent 
entity; its acquisition by another firm; or as previously pointed to, its liquidation. 
                                                 
1
 US Courts bankruptcy statistics, available from http://www.uscourts.gov/.  
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Models attempting to predict the outcomes of bankruptcy proceedings are not without 
precedent and each has strived to distinguish itself from the rest, from the early probit 
models of Casey et al. (1986) to the wave of survival analysis models initiated by 
Bandopadhyaya (1994). In the field of survival analysis in particular, it being a 
relatively new application in financial research, studies have primarily concerned 
themselves with the introduction of new model specifications and functional forms. In 
this rush for distinction, however, few studies have had time to look back on 
established models to see why they worked or, in some cases, why they didn’t. 
Perhaps as a response to this, or perhaps merely in search of answers, the present 
study directed its attention at the survival analysis model proposed by Partington, 
Stevenson, Russel and Torbey (2001) and extended by Wong, Partington, Stevenson 
and Torbey (2007).  
Partington et al. (2001) and Wong et al. (2007) (hereafter referred to as the “original 
studies”), applied Cox’s (1972) proportional hazards model in an examination of 
Chapter 11 outcome from the perspective of a firm’s existing shareholders. From this 
perspective, regardless of the mode of resolution, there were essentially only two 
possible outcomes: 
1. The firm exits Chapter 11 proceedings with some value for its existing 
shareholders; or 
2. The existing shareholders receive nothing. 
With Russel et al. (1999) finding, for a sample of 154 filing firms in the period 1984 
to 1993, that 60% of shareholders investing in Chapter 11 filing firms received no 
return on their investments, and with many firms shying away from much of the 
market due to their inability to satisfy exchange listing rules2, this was by no means a 
trivial issue. Beginning with a set of eleven predictor covariates and a filtered sample 
of 59 bankruptcy-filing-firms from the period 1984 to 1993, Partington et al. (2001) 
constructed a five-variable model which was purported to have a predictive accuracy 
                                                 
2
 For instance, the US Securities and Exchange Commission notes that both the New York Stock 
Exchange (NYSE) and NASDAQ have rules in this regard, however, existing shares in a company 
under Chapter 11 protection may continue to trade over-the-counter. 
(See http://www.sec.gov/investor/pubs/bankrupt.htmboth). 
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of 0.8 (based on an in-sample analysis of predictive accuracy using Receiver 
Operating Characteristic (ROC) curves). Using an extended estimation sample of 125 
firms spanning the period 1984-1996, the Partington et al. (2001) model (comprising 
of three firm-specific covariates and two market-wide covariates) was re-estimated by 
Wong et al. (2007). The model proved to be highly unstable with respect to time, with 
only two of the five covariates retaining their significance when the model was 
estimated over the entire estimation period. When tested against a hold-out sample 
consisting of 94 bankruptcy filings from 1997 to 1999, both the Wong et al. (2007) 
two-variable and the Partington et al. (2001) five-variable models were unable to 
outperform a randomly allocated forecast. 
The instability of the model from the original studies suggested the presence of some 
unobserved heterogeneity in the data which had not been controlled for. In an inquiry 
into this issue, the same dataset of bankruptcy filings utilised in the original studies 
(spanning 1984 to 1999) was reconsidered. The entire set of eleven covariates first 
introduced by Partington et al. (2001) was reconstructed for a sample of 125 filing 
firms covering the entire sample period. The eleven-variable model proposed by 
Partington et al. (2001) was re-estimated and assessed for its stability over time. A 
time-dependent proportional hazards model was further proposed to account for 
changes in the economic climate (as captured by the two market-wide covariates) 
throughout each firm’s life in Chapter 11 proceedings. As was the case in Wong et al. 
(2007), the instability of both models was quite apparent, though it also became 
apparent that much of this instability could be attributed to multicollinearity among 
the covariates. When multicollinearity was controlled for in a parsimonious three-
variable model (consisting of one market-wide covariate and two firm-specific size 
and earnings covariates), this instability was also tamed. However, the level of 
instability vis-à-vis the magnitudes of the estimated coefficients remained and, in the 
case of the time-dependant model, the once consistently stable market-wide covariate 
now became highly volatile in statistical as well as economic significance. 
Deconstruction. Once again faced with further questions, the present study broke 
away from orthodoxy and utilised a different approach to proportional hazards 
modelling which enabled the effects of the predictor covariates to be examined in 
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abstraction from the effects of time. In that regard, it was the contention of the present 
study that there were two effects of time potentially affecting expected outcomes: 
1. The time spent by a firm (or its duration) in Chapter 11 proceedings (the 
“duration effect”); and 
2. The changing Chapter 11 environment (economic or otherwise) through the 
years (the “calendar effect”). 
While the application of survival analysis in finance was popularised, in part, by its 
ability to capture the duration dependence of expected outcomes, the proposed 
approach allowed the calendar effect of time to also be captured. As intended, the 
market-wide covariate was driven to insignificance. Yet even with the systematic 
effects of time controlled for, the two (firm-specific) covariates remaining in the 
model continued to diminish in economic significance over time.  
Reconstruction. Presented with another clue, but few answers, an attempt was made to 
extract a ‘synopsis’ of this ‘calendar effect’ of time. Faced with a tentative conclusion 
that expected outcomes of Chapter 11 proceedings tended towards shareholders 
receiving no return the later in the sample period a firm entered Chapter 11, the 
present study looked to the changing characteristics or the ‘changing face’ of firms 
filing for Chapter 11 to determine if there were non-systematic (specifically firm-
level) factors driving this calendar effect, and indeed, the model’s persistent 
instability. It was found that both could potentially be attributed, in part, to the entry 
into Chapter 11 of abnormally poor performing firms in the latter part of the sample 
period. The entry of firms with high risk structures during that time was also raised as 
a possibility and the effects of industry membership were investigated. In respect of 
those two final inquiries, the present study offers a warning that given the scarcity of 
established economic theory in the field, assertions made about the determinants of 
expected Chapter 11 outcomes must be made with caution and with the period under 
examination constantly in mind. 
The remainder of this paper is set out as follows. Section 2 reviews the literature in 
the area of bankruptcy prediction and introduces survival analysis, setting the scene 
for a discussion on Wong et al. (2007) and Cox’s proportional hazards model in 
Section 3, where a potential explanation for the Wong et al. (2007) model’s instability 
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is also discussed. Section 4 then describes the data and presents the study’s 
methodology, introducing the models proposed to tackle the issues faced by Wong et 
al. (2007). The results from this investigation are set out in Section 5 raising new 
questions about the model. Section 6 introduces a different approach to model 
construction in order to control for the duration and calendar effects of time and 
outlines some results. Section 7 looks to the ‘calendar effect’ with Section 8 offering 
some possible answers regarding this effect in the form of non-systematic firm-based 
factors. Section 9 concludes. 
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2. Background: A brief history of bankruptcy prediction 
 
2.1. Predicting the onset of financial distress 
 
Models of bankruptcy prediction have traditionally concerned themselves with the 
onset of financial distress, typically deemed to have occurred when a firm has filed for 
bankruptcy. Beaver (1966), in a univariate study, compared a list of financial ratios for 
failed (distressed) firms and a matched sample of non-failed firms to determine the 
best individual predictor of failure. Altman (1968), oft cited as the seminal work in 
bankruptcy prediction, produced a ratio-based model using multiple discriminant 
analysis (MDA), a technique used to classify an observation into one of several 
groupings based on the observation’s individual characteristics. Using MDA, a linear 
combination of variables was fitted for the purpose of forming a discriminant score, or 
Z value, which was then used to classify the observations based on some cut-off point. 
The study identified several variables as being significant in classifying filing firms 
(that is, those firms which were to file for bankruptcy in the following year) and non-
filing firms, including:  
1. Working Capital/Total Assets; 
2. Retained Earnings/Total Assets; 
3. Earnings Before Interest and Tax/Total Assets; 
4. Market Value of Equity/Book Value of Total Debt; 
5. Sales/Total Assets 
In a sample of 33 filing firms with a matched set of 33 non-filing firms, the model 
was found to correctly classify 95% of the firms with 6% Type I error and 3% Type II 
error3. When used to predict the onset of financial distress based on data collected two 
                                                 
3
 A Type 1 error is defined as the probability of rejecting a true hypothesis. In the case of Altman 
(1968), a Type 1 error occurred when a failed firm was misclassified as a non-failed firm. Conversely, a 
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years prior to bankruptcy filing, the model maintained high though reduced 
classification accuracy. Significantly, Altman (1968) recognised the bias inherent in 
his study when the same firms used to determine discriminant coefficients were then 
re-classified. To this end, out-of-sample testing was conducted using the discriminant 
coefficients from the estimation sample, with quite significant results achieved by the 
model. 
The work of Ohlson (1980) saw the beginning of the second chapter in financial 
distress modelling with the introduction of a class of qualitative response regression 
models. The study launched a staunch critique of the MDA method used in Altman 
(1968), noting that: 
1. The stringent statistical requirements imposed on the distributional properties 
of the predictors could not always be met. For example, the requirement that 
the variance-covariance matrices of predictors should be the same for failed 
and non-failed firms; 
2. The assumption of normally distributed predictors meant that dummy 
variables could not be applied; 
3. The MDA output score, essentially a rank, had little intuitive value; and 
4. The procedures used to match filing and non-filing firms (size and industry) 
were arbitrary, with such characteristics better suited to being predictors in the 
model. 
Ohlson (1980) concluded that conditional logit analysis, which avoided the above 
criticisms, would be a superior method. The study considered 105 bankrupt firms and 
2,058 non-bankrupt firms during the period 1970 to 1976. By having a sample which 
was more representative of the population of bankrupt and non-bankrupt firms, this 
study also mitigated the problem of “choice-based sample bias” noted in Zmijewski 
(1985) (a critique which could be maintained for the matched sampling technique 
used in Altman, 1986). The study also advocated the use of financial statement data 
                                                                                                                                            
Type II error (the probability of not rejecting a false hypothesis) occurred when a non-failed firm was 
wrongly classified as having failed. 
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rather than data from the Moody’s manual. The latter, it was contended, may in fact 
reflect information compiled after a firm had filed for bankruptcy. Thus, reliance on 
that information in producing a classification model would essentially amount to 
“back-casting”. Ohlson’s (1980) model was tested over various predictive horizons 
using a cut-off value which minimised misclassifications. However, the study failed to 
conduct any out-of-sample testing. Nevertheless, based on this model, Ohlson (1980) 
concluded that there were four basic factors which could be used to predict the onset 
of financial distress, namely: 
1. Size; 
2. Financial structure (or leverage, as proxied by Total Liabilities/Total Assets); 
3. Performance (Net Income or Funds from Operations/Total Assets); and  
4. Current liquidity (as proxied by Current Liabilities/Current Assets and/or 
Working Capital/Total Assets). 
In what was presented as a development upon traditional “static” bankruptcy 
prediction models, Shumway (2001) proposed a “hazard model” to predict the onset 
of financial distress. He noted that “by ignoring the fact that firms change through 
time, static models produce bankruptcy probabilities that are biased and inconsistent 
estimates of the probabilities that they approximate” (Shumway, 2001: 101). In 
addition, static models, by observing information at a fixed period prior to bankruptcy 
(for example, one year prior to bankruptcy filing), created a selection bias when they 
did not control for each firm’s “period at risk” (or the time during which it was at risk 
of financial distress before actually failing). 
In contrast, hazard models explicitly accounted for the fact that the risk of bankruptcy 
changed through time. Such models also had the capacity to deal with censored data 
(whereby firms left the sample for reasons other than the event of interest), and 
allowed for the use of time varying covariates to “exploit each firm’s time series data” 
(Shumway, 2001: 102). Interestingly, Shumway (2001) found that accounting 
variables held to be significant in traditional predictive models were no longer 
statistically related to failure under a hazard model framework. In response to this, the 
use of market-driven variables (such as market size, past stock returns, and the 
idiosyncratic standard deviation of stock returns) was proposed to supplement 
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accounting variables (for example, Net Income/Total Assets and measures of 
leverage). 
The model proposed by Shumway (2001) was, as its name suggested, a “simple 
hazard model” in that it dealt with discrete time intervals and was essentially a logit 
model recomputed each year based on the firms which had filed for bankruptcy that 
year. Nonetheless, it demonstrated a potential for duration or hazard modelling, more 
commonly known as survival analysis, a technique which has gained popularity in a 
distinct but related line of research, namely, predictive models of bankruptcy 
resolution.  
 
2.2. Predicting the resolution of bankruptcy 
 
Once a firm has filed for bankruptcy, the issue of interest then becomes how those 
bankruptcy proceedings will be resolved. White (1981) considered firms which had 
filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy and developed a theoretical model for classifying 
those firms that successfully reorganised from those that were liquidated. It was 
postulated that firms which were likely to successfully reorganise: 
1. Held more free assets: which were available as collateral for additional 
borrowing; 
2. Were larger in size: again increasing its borrowing capacity since it was likely 
to have raised capital and generated assets in the past; 
3. Had more attractive earnings prospects: thus enabling the internal generation 
of funds or the ability to obtain additional funds from external borrowing; and 
4. Had strong equity commitments by management: providing an incentive to 
reorganise rather than liquidate. 
The White (1981) study initiated a new arm of bankruptcy research concerned with 
predicting the outcome for those firms which had filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy. As 
Bandopadhyaya (1994: 346) pointed out, “predictions on emergence from Chapter 11 
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protection represent useful information to management, investors and creditors of 
affected corporations”. 
 
2.2.1. Predicting the resolution of bankruptcy using traditional methods 
Casey et al. (1986) conducted a probit analysis to empirically test the White (1981) 
model. Success was defined as a firm whose reorganisation plans were approved by 
creditors and confirmed by the court, and which continued operation for at least three 
years subsequent to the confirmation. Liquidation was deemed to equate to failure. 
The study considered 57 successes and 61 failures during the period 1970 to 1981. Its 
sample was compiled after filtering out firms for which financial statement 
information was not available and those firms whose confirmation date occurred more 
than three years after filing for bankruptcy. The latter filter, though admittedly 
arbitrary, was in place to ensure that “an inordinate amount of time would not elapse 
between the date of the financial data set and the determination of critical 
success/failure dates of each company” (Casey et al., 1986: 254). Significantly, it was 
noted that “as the elapsed time increases, it becomes less likely that the financial 
condition prior to bankruptcy will correlate significantly with the eventual status of 
these firms” (Casey et al., 1986: 254), a warning which should be heeded by any 
study of bankruptcy resolution. Additional filters removed a further five firms. Probit 
analysis was conducted for the combined sample with an estimation period covering 
1970 to 1975. During the estimation period, the analyses were repeated for 20 random 
sub-samples (each with five successes and five failures randomly removed) to 
examine the stability and repeatability of the procedure. The estimated model was 
then applied to a hold-out sample to determine its predictive accuracy. The model was 
found to accurately classify 69.4% of firms in the estimation sample, with a 
classification accuracy of 58.8% in the hold-out sample. 
Casey et al. (1986) concluded that there were two factors with significant 
discriminating power in predicting bankruptcy resolution, namely, the proportion of 
non-collateralised tangible assets at the bankruptcy filing date (a proxy for White’s 
(1981) ‘free assets’), and the change in profitability in the years preceding bankruptcy 
(to proxy for earnings prospects, and as measured by Retained Earnings/Total Assets 
in the estimation sample, and Net Income/Total Assets when the model was re-
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estimated in the hold-out sample). A Change in Total Assets variable (measuring the 
three year change in assets prior to filing) was also found to be a significant proxy for 
White’s (1981) ‘free assets’. 
In a similar vein to Casey et al. (1986), Barniv et al. (2002) attempted to predict 
bankruptcy resolution by applying a logistic regression model on the first day after a 
firm had filed for bankruptcy. Bankruptcy resolution was classified into those firms 
that were subsequently acquired by other firms, those which emerged as independent 
entities, and those which were liquidated. The study considered 237 publicly traded 
companies which filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy from 1980 to 1992, following their 
progress until 1995. The companies studied were those for which the outcome of the 
Chapter 11 proceedings was known, and for which the required financial information 
was available. Within the sample, 49 were acquired, 119 emerged as independent 
entities, and 69 were liquidated. Bankruptcy filings during the period from 1987 to 
1991, consisting of 123 firms, were used in a hold-out sample. An analysis of the 
sample based on Cumulative Abnormal Returns (CAR) found that investors incurred 
losses from 60 days pre-filing to one day after filing. It was also found that investors 
in acquired and emerged firms experienced significant positive returns between filing 
and final resolution (with CARs of 155% and 137% respectively), while investors in 
liquidated firms experienced a CAR of -11%. Analyses based on Buy-and-Hold 
Abnormal Returns (BHAR) generated the same ordering of returns though with 
different magnitudes. 
In searching for relevant predictor variables, Barniv et al. (2002) considered 
traditional models of bankruptcy prediction (among them Altman, 1968; and Ohlson, 
1980), and found that from a sample of 3,000 healthy firms and 237 filing firms, all 
variables from those models performed reasonably well in predicting the onset of 
financial distress. However, univariate analyses using logistic regressions suggested 
that only two of those variables were statistically significant in predicting bankruptcy 
resolution, namely, firm size and Net Income/Total Assets. In seeking other predictors, 
Barniv et al. (2002) used logit analysis to compile a list of ten variables consisting of 
five accounting variables, including a profitability ratio and a proxy for size, and five 
court related non-accounting variables such as the resignation of top executives (to 
represent management change), and findings of past fraud. 
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Using the Lachenbruch (1967) approach4, the cut-off point at which misclassifications 
were minimised for the estimation sample was applied to determine the predictive 
accuracy of the model in the hold-out sample.  The expected cost of misclassification 
(as proposed by Hsieh, 1993) was also considered since, as the CAR analyses 
suggested, it was more costly to misclassify a liquidated firm than it was to 
misclassify an acquired or emerged firm.  
Barniv et al. (2002) concluded that their ten-variable model performed better than 
each of the five-variable models (the accounting model and the non-accounting 
model, respectively), suggesting that there were benefits from using non-accounting 
data. Using the ten-variable model, in-sample classification was found to be 61.6% 
accurate and 75.1% accurate when bankruptcy resolutions were classified only as 
being liquidations or otherwise. This was deemed to be better than a proportionate 
random classification. Hold-out sample predictions were found to be 48% and 69.9% 
accurate for three-group and two-group classifications, respectively. 
Interestingly, an ancillary result in the study was that the duration of Chapter 11 
proceedings differed between the different outcome classifications. Specifically, the 
average duration between filing and final resolution was found to be 365 days for 
liquidated firms, 501 days for acquired firms, and 633 days emerged firms. This result 
suggested that for those firms under Chapter 11 protection, the expected outcome of 
their proceedings should vary with the length of time already spent in Chapter 11. 
This notion of an expected outcome’s duration dependence highlighted the significant 
role which could be played by survival analysis in this area of research. 
 
                                                 
4
 The Lachenbruch approach is technique entailing the removal of one observation from the model 
estimation process for use a ‘hold-out’ to test the estimated model’s in-sample predictive accuracy. This 
process is then repeated for all individuals in the estimation sample. 
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2.3. Introducing survival analysis to bankruptcy prediction 
 
Survival analysis “is a class of statistical methods for studying the occurrence and 
timing of events” (Allison, 1995: 1). Essentially, it models, for those individuals who 
experienced some pre-specified event of interest during a study, the length of time (or 
duration) until the occurrence of that event. Originally designed for use in the medical 
arena to study deaths, its application has extended to the study of a multitude of 
events in other areas of research, including finance. 
As Bandopadhyaya (1994) identified, the advantage of using survival analysis as a 
statistical tool rests in its explicit recognition of duration dependence and censored 
data, features which boded well with its application in medical research. Unlike 
traditional dichotomous dependent variable models (which model the occurrence or 
otherwise of events), survival analysis models also consider the timing of events, thus 
accounting for any potential duration dependence in the likelihood of ‘failure’ (an 
event’s occurrence). Whilst it would also be possible to simply examine failure time 
(the time until the occurrence of an event) as a dependent variable using ordinary least 
squares regression, biases may arise from the incorrect treatment of data concerning 
those individuals who did not experience the event of interest (either by exiting the 
study for reasons other than by failing or by outliving the sample period). This 
‘censored data’ is explicitly accounted for in survival analysis models. 
Survival analysis assumes that the failure time, T, is generated by a stochastic process 
and thus has a probability distribution which can be represented by the cumulative 
distribution function F(t) (with t denoting time) as given by: 
 
 ( ) ( )F t P T t= ≤  (2.1) 
 
In survival analysis, one often deals with the survivor function, or the probability that 
an individual survived beyond time t: 
 
 ( ) ( ) 1 ( )S t P T t F t= > = −  (2.2) 
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The probability density function, which describes the unconditional instantaneous 
probability of failure, can then be given by:  
 
 
( ) ( ) ( )( ) lim ( )
P t T t t dF t dS tf t
t d t dt∆→∞
≤ < + ∆
= = = −
∆
 (2.3) 
 
However, in survival analysis, it is more common to examine the hazard function:  
 
 
0
( | )( ) lim P t T t t T tt
t
λ
∆→
≤ < + ∆ ≥
=
∆
  (2.4) 
 
The hazard rate5 produced by this function represents the instantaneous rate of failure 
at time T = t, conditional upon survival until time t. The premise behind this condition 
is that it removes from consideration those individuals who are no longer at risk of 
experiencing the event. 
Having estimated the hazard function, it then becomes possible to derive the survivor 
function per:  
 
 
0
( ) exp ( )
t
S t u duλ = − 
 
∫   (2.5) 
 
Given the estimated hazard function, it is also possible to derive, amongst other 
things, the conditional expected life of the individual. That is, an individual’s expected 
time to failure, T, conditional on its survival until time t: 
                                                 
5
 As Allison (1995) noted, the hazard is not a probability but a rate denoting the number of events 
expected to occur per interval of time. It is therefore possible for the hazard to be greater than one. 
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1[ | ] ( )E T T t tλ> =  (2.6) 
 
It is therefore not surprising that much of the work in survival analysis centres around 
the estimation of the hazard function. 
 
2.3.1. Survival analysis in predicting bankruptcy resolution 
In one of the earlier studies to use survival analysis to predict Chapter 11 resolution, 
Bandopadhyaya (1994) studied a sample of 74 firms which filed for Chapter 11 
protection from 1979 to 1990 to examine their hazard rate of exit from those 
proceedings. The study considered the effects of a number of covariates on the hazard 
rate, including: 
1. Firm specific covariates: 
a. Firm solvency (Long Term Debt to Asset); 
b. Outstanding interest; and 
c. Number of shares outstanding. 
2. Industry specific covariate: 
a. Capacity utilisation. 
3. Economy-wide covariates: 
a. Prime interest rate; and 
b. GNP growth. 
It was found that the interest burden of a firm, as well the capacity utilisation of the 
industry to which the firm belonged, significantly increased that firm’s hazard rate of 
exit from Chapter 11. As Bandopadhyaya (1994) noted, a positive effect on the hazard 
rate of exit was synonymous with a negative effect on the firm’s expected life in 
Chapter 11 (see Equation (2.6)). A number of other covariates, while significant in 
predicting a firm’s entrance into Chapter 11, were not so significant in predicting the 
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firm’s exit from Chapter 11. The statistically significant positive impact of interest 
obligations on a firm’s hazard rate of exit was contrary to a priori expectations and 
appeared intuitively unsound. However, Bandopadhyaya (1994) explained that high 
interest obligations had two distinct effects on the hazard: 
1. A high interest burden required the distressed firm to undergo major 
reorganisation, creating a negative impact on the hazard (the “reorganisation 
effect”); but 
2. The larger the obligations, the more likely it was that existing creditors would 
be willing to renegotiate their contracts, leading to a positive impact on the 
hazard (the “renegotiation effect”). 
Thus, it was argued, the positive impact of interest obligations indicated the 
dominance of the renegotiation effect over the reorganisation effect. 
In relation to the duration dependence of the hazard, Bandopadhyaya (1994) found 
using a Weibull specification that a firm’s hazard rate of exit from Chapter 11 
increased with the time spent in those proceedings. This positive duration dependence 
was attributed to the nature of the Chapter 11 process. Specifically, a period of time 
must lapse before a reorganisation plan could be proposed, thus leading to an initial 
hazard rate of exit close to zero. A further period of time was then required for all 
classes of creditors and equity holders to consent to an implementation of the plan. As 
time passed, it was contended, the rate of consent and thereby the hazard rate of exit 
from Chapter 11 would increase. 
In a similar study, Li (1999), looking to empirical findings of wide variations in the 
durations of Chapter 11 proceedings, examined the determinants of that duration for 
distressed high-yield-debt issuing companies which filed for Chapter 11 from 1980 to 
1991. As in Bandopadhyaya (1994), the hazard was defined to be the instantaneous 
rate of emergence from Chapter 11. Using a Bayesian model comparison criterion to 
examine some of the more common functional forms of duration dependence, Li 
(1999) rejected the exponential and Weibull formulations as being too restrictive as 
they only allowed for positive or negative duration dependence. Rather, it was 
suggested that a log-logistic functional form would produce a more flexible model. 
   
23
Applying the log-logistic model, Li found that duration in Chapter 11 was shortened 
by: 
1. The choice of pre-packaged Chapter 11 plans; 
2. Pre-Chapter 11 negotiations; and 
3. A higher gross profit margin (EBITDA/ Sales). 
On the other hand, the following covariates extended the time spent in Chapter 11: 
1. The interruption of legal disputes; 
2. Firms size (as proxied by Total Book Liabilities); 
Interestingly, Li (1999) also identified the changing bankruptcy environment in the 
1990s as a significant factor influencing Chapter 11 emergence. Using a post-1990 
indicator variable, it was found that firms which filed for Chapter 11 after 1990 spent 
less time in Chapter 11 before emerging, with Li (1999) contending that this was due 
to the growing experience and efficiency of bankruptcy judges and professionals. 
Finally, in using the log-logistic formulation, Li (1999) concluded that the underlying 
hazard function (or the nature of the duration dependence) took an inverted U-shape, 
noting that the hazard rate increased with the time spent in Chapter 11 until the 21st 
month, after which the hazard declined towards zero. Like Bandopadhyaya (1994), Li 
(1999) contended that this hazard function was consistent with the institutional 
features of the Chapter 11 process. The study recognised that the first six months in 
Chapter 11 would see a low hazard rate of exit as reorganisation plans were being 
formulated and approved. The hazard was not zero, however, since a number of firms 
in the sample were subject to ‘pre-packaged’ (or pre-negotiated) bankruptcy plans and 
could promptly exit Chapter 11 proceedings. As per Bandopadhyaya (1994), Li (1999) 
noted that this would be followed by a sharp increase in the hazard rate. However, it 
was then contended that as time passed, it became harder and harder for the distressed 
firm to sell assets or to continuously obtain post-petition financing, thus driving the 
hazard rate back towards zero, hence the inverted U-shape. 
This lack of consensus in selecting an underlying hazard function and in identifying 
the nature of the hazard’s duration dependence was one of the motivating factors 
behind the Partington et al. (2001) study.  
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2.4. Partington, Russell, Stevenson, and Torbey (2001) 
 
Like Bandopadhyaya (1994) and Li (1999), Partington et al. (2001) attempted to 
develop a survival analysis model for predicting the outcome of Chapter 11 
proceedings. The study could be distinguished from the earlier works in two ways. 
Firstly, in computing the hazard (or the instantaneous rate of failure), “failure” was 
defined as the exit from Chapter 11 with no value for the firm’s existing shareholders. 
In a study of 154 firms which entered into Chapter 11 from 1984 to 19936, Russel et 
al. (1999) found that 60% of stock holders investing in filing firms received no return 
on their investment, with a -70% return on average. Thus, the Partington et al. (2001) 
study was of particular interest to equity holders. The second distinctive feature of 
Partington et al. (2001) was in its choice of Cox’s (1972) proportional hazards model, 
a more general survival analysis model which does not require the parametric form of 
the underlying hazard function to be specified.  
Partington et al. (2001) considered 154 cases of entry into Chapter 11 for companies 
listed on the NYSE, AMEX or NASDAQ, except financial institutions, for the period 
January 1984 to December 1993. This was reduced to a final sample of 59 cases after 
subjecting the data to certain filters. Beginning with a set of two market-wide and nine 
firm-specific predictor covariates, forward stepwise estimation was carried out to only 
include those covariates that were significant to the 10% level. This resulted in a 
model comprising of: 
1. Three firm-specific covariates: 
a. Firm size (the natural logarithm of Market Value); 
b. Profitability (EBITD/Total Assets);  
c. Liquidity (Current Assets/Current Liabilities); and 
                                                 
6
 The same dataset was subsequently examined by Partington et al. (2001). 
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2. Two market-wide covariates: 
a. Default Spread (capturing the general risk of default in the economy, as 
given by the BAA corporate bond rate according to Moody’s less the 
Treasury Bond rate); and 
b. Term spread (a term structure indicator capturing business cycle effects 
as given by the difference between the Treasury Bill and Treasury 
Bond rates). 
In the Partington et al. (2001) model, the greatest contribution was made by Default 
Spread, which had a negative impact on the hazard rate. The Default Spread covariate 
was used to proxy for the level of credit risk in the economy and, a priori, a high 
Default Spread was expected to reflect an environment in which a firm’s hazard of 
exiting Chapter 11 with no value for its existing shareholders would be high. 
However, contrary to expectations, this was not found to be the case. In applying a 
similar reasoning as that raised by Bandopadhyaya (1994), Partington et al. (2001) 
contended that during periods of high default risk, creditors were adverse to protracted 
proceedings, thus reducing the hazard of exiting Chapter 11 with no value for 
shareholders7. This issue, however, was to remain a subject which required further 
investigation. 
Due to the small sample size, a Lachenbruch approach rather than a hold-out sample 
was utilised to test for the model’s predictive accuracy. A significant contribution of 
the study in this regard was in its use of receiver operating characteristic (ROC) 
curves, which bypassed the problem of having to choose a cut-off probability value. 
Rather, the ROC curve illustrated the trade-off between the “hit rate” and the “false 
alarm rate” as the cut-off probability was increased. The “hit rate” represented the 
predictive power of the test and was equivalent to one less the probability of a Type II 
error (the probability of not rejecting a false hypothesis). The “false alarm rate” was 
synonymous with the probability of a Type I error (the probability of rejecting a true 
hypothesis). Using this approach, a model containing only firm-specific covariates 
                                                 
7
 To use the terminology of Bandopadhyaya (1994), the ‘reorganisation effect’ was overwhelmed by the 
‘renegotiation effect’. 
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and a model which also held market-wide covariates were found to both have 
predictive accuracies of 0.80 (as given by the area under the ROC curve, with perfect 
classification being 1.00). 
It was within this backdrop that the Wong et al. (2007) study was conducted. 
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3. Wong et al. (2007) and Cox’s proportional hazards model 
 
Before, entering into any discussion about Wong et al. (2007), it would perhaps be 
prudent to first introduce Cox’s (1972) proportional hazards model, which played so 
vital a role in the present study. 
 
3.1. Cox’s proportional hazards model 
 
Cox’s proportional hazards model can be expressed as: 
 
 
( ' )
0( , ) ( ) zt z t e βλ λ=  (3.1) 
 
z and β denote the vector of covariates examined in the model and the vector of their 
coefficients, respectively, while the underlying hazard function λ0(t) represents the 
duration dependence of the hazard, an issue which has previously been discussed. The 
novelty of Cox’s proportional hazards model rests in its semi-parametric form. 
Specifically, while the underlying hazard is assumed to take on some functional form, 
the nature of that function need not be defined8. This is a direct consequence of the 
model’s imposition of the proportional hazards assumption9, and its application of the 
maximum partial likelihood estimation method. 
 
                                                 
8
 Alternatively put, the underlying probability distribution of failure times (first introduced in Equation 
(2.1)) need not be specified. 
9
 As will be demonstrated in Section 3.4, however, Cox’s model has the capacity to relax this 
assumption of proportional hazards through the use of time-varying covariates. 
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3.1.1. Proportional hazards 
To illustrate the notion of proportional hazards, consider individuals i and j. From 
Equation (3.1), the ratio of their hazards can be given by: 
 
 
( ' ) ( ' )
0
( ' ) ( ' )
0
( ) ( )
( ) ( )
i i
j j
z z
i
z z
j
t t e e
t t e e
β β
β β
λ λ
λ λ= =  (3.2) 
 
Thus, it can be shown that the ratio of the hazards for any two individuals is constant 
over time (that is, regardless of the nature of the underlying hazard function). Given 
this property, it is then possible, using the partial likelihood method, to estimate the 
coefficients of the proportional hazards model in abstraction from the underlying 
hazard function. Before continuing with the discussion on partial likelihood, however, 
it is necessary to first consider the way in which data is generally handled in survival 
analysis.  
 
3.1.2. Some concepts in survival analysis 
Individuals in a survival analysis study are said to enter a ‘risk set’ when they become 
at risk of experiencing the event of interest, exiting that risk set when they ‘fail’ (that 
is, experience the event) or when they leave the study for some other reason, thereby 
becoming ‘censored’. In the present study, for example, firms are deemed to enter a 
risk set when they file for Chapter 11 bankruptcy, and exit the risk set once they exit 
Chapter 11 with no value for their shareholders (the event of interest) or when they 
are censored (for example, by exiting Chapter 11 with some value for their existing 
shareholders or by outliving the sample period). 
In many survival analysis studies, including the present study, individuals will enter 
and leave a risk set at different times throughout the period under examination. 
However, rather than arranging observations according to this ‘calendar time’, it is 
predominantly the case that individuals will be ordered by way of ‘event time’. That 
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is, each individual is deemed to have entered the risk set at event time zero. The risk 
set is then reconstructed each time an observation is censored and more importantly, 
for the purposes of estimating the hazard function, at each failure time (that is, each 
‘event time’ when an individual fails)10. Figure 1 demonstrates by way of an example 
this difference between ‘calendar time’ and ‘event time’, and highlights the difference 
between censorship and failure. 
Figure 1 
Distinguishing calendar time from event time 
 
Observations A-E as they enter and exit the risk set in calendar time: 
 
Observations A-E as they are arranged in event time: 
 
                                                 
10
 It is in this way that the duration dependence of the hazard is able to be captured by the underlying 
hazard function. 
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3.1.3. Partial likelihood method 
A partial likelihood is defined as the product of the likelihoods for all observed 
failures11. Thus, where I failures were observed in a study, the partial likelihood 
function can be expressed as: 
 
 
1
I
i
i
PL L
=
= Π  (3.3) 
 
Li, the likelihood of the ith event, is defined as the probability of individual i’s failure 
at time Ti, conditional on its survival until Ti. Alternatively put, it is the probability 
that at Ti, it was individual i who failed, and not any of the other individuals who had 
survived up to Ti. Li can therefore be given by the ratio of individual i’s hazard to the 
hazards of all other individuals in the risk set at time Ti, R(Ti), thus: 
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The likelihood function provides several insights into the operation of the proportional 
hazards model. Firstly, it is at this stage of the calculation when the model explicitly 
accounts for information from those observations which were in the risk set at time Ti, 
but which then became censored at some subsequent time. It is also at this stage of the 
calculation when the underlying hazard function is eliminated, thus enabling the 
partial likelihood method to estimate the β coefficients in isolation from the 
underlying hazard. Indeed, the removal of the underlying hazard function also renders 
the exact times of each failure irrelevant, such that the only factor for consideration in 
                                                 
11
 A partial likelihood function can be distinguished from an ordinary likelihood function which gives 
the product of likelihoods for all individuals in the study (and not only the failures). 
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this respect is the ordering of events for the purposes of constructing risk sets at each 
failure time12. 
Given Lj, the partial likelihood can then be constructed: 
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It is then possible to estimate the β coefficients by maximising the partial likelihood 
function with respect to β. As a matter of convenience, it is often more common 
maximise (with respect to β) the logarithm of the partial likelihood function, as given 
by:  
 
 
'
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Following the example of Partington et al. (2001), Cox’s proportional hazards model 
was again applied by Wong et al. (2007). 
 
                                                 
12
 This also means that the partial likelihood method becomes invalid with tied data (where more than 
one failure occurs at the same time). However, most statistical programs, including SAS, have the 
capability to handle this tied data. In the present study, an ‘exact’ method of handling tied data was 
utilised. This method assumes that there is some underlying order in the failures which have merely 
been aggregated into discrete failure times. This method produces true partial likelihood estimates. 
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3.2. Wong, Partington, Stevenson, and Torbey (2007) 
 
Wong et al. (2007) represented a significant extension to the Partington et al. (2001) 
study. Using a larger sample of bankruptcy filings from 1984 to 1999, the model 
proposed by Partington et al. (2001) was re-estimated and tested against a hold-out 
sample. As in Partington et al. (2001), the event of interest was a firm’s exit from 
Chapter 11 with no value for its existing shareholders. 
The five-variable model of Default Spread, Term Spread, EBITD/Total Assets, CA/CL 
and loge(Market Value) was estimated on an estimation sample of 125 firms which 
had filed for bankruptcy from 1984 to 1996.  To examine the stability of the model, 
data from the estimation sample was added to the original Partington et al. (2001) 
sample in yearly phases. Wong et al. (2007) found13 that as observations were 
incrementally added to the sample, the number of covariates deemed to be statistically 
significant gradually declined. When the model was finally estimated using the entire 
estimation sample, only the market value and Default Spread covariates (out of the 
initial five covariates) remained significant predictors of failure. Like Partington et al. 
(2001), Wong et al. (2007) found that, contrary to expectations, a wide Default Spread 
(representing a high level of credit risk in the economy) had a negative impact on a 
firm’s hazard of exiting Chapter 11 with no value for its shareholders. More 
significantly, however, this set of results was the first of several indications in that 
study that there may have been some underlying heterogeneity in the data that was not 
controlled by the model. 
Wong et al. (2007) then applied the two-variable model (estimated from the 
estimation sample) to a hold-out sample of 94 firms taken from 1997 to 1999. Using 
ROC curves to examine predictive accuracy, the Wong et al. (2007) model was 
found14 to predict worse out-of-sample than a randomly allocated forecast. 
 
                                                 
13
 See Table 5, Wong et al. (2007), p373. 
14
 See Figure 2, Wong et al. (2007), p383.  
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3.3. What went wrong? 
 
The results in Wong et al. (2007) suggested some unobserved heterogeneity in the 
data that was not controlled for in their model. In particular, the instability of the 
model through time, and its poor performance as a predictor when tested against a 
hold-out sample spanning the final two years of the study, suggested that there may 
have been some structural change, through time, in the Chapter 11 environment. 
Although, prima facie, such a structural change would invariably have involved a 
change in the economic climate, much of those changes should have been captured by 
the market-wide Default Spread and Term Spread covariates. The fact that their 
presence in the Wong et al. (2007) model could not properly account for this structural 
change suggested some potential issues with that model. 
Consider the assumption, taken by conventional proportional hazards models, of a 
constant ratio of hazards over time. This assumption may prove to be unrealistic or 
even prohibitively restrictive. Indeed, it is not implausible that the magnitudes of 
certain covariates, or their impacts on an individual’s hazard of failure, may change 
over the life of that individual15. The use of time-varying or time-dependent covariates 
is one means by which one can relax the assumption of proportional hazards. 
 
3.4. A time-dependent proportional hazards model 
 
To illustrate, one can generate an expression for a time-dependent proportional 
hazards model by taking the conventional hazard function from Equation (3.1) and 
modifying it to account for time-dependent covariates (with z(t) representing the 
vector of covariates at time t), thus:  
                                                 
15
 Wong et al. (2007) tested the assumption of proportional hazards using a scaled Schoenfeld residuals 
test, testing for each coefficient the null hypothesis that it did not contain a time-varying component. 
Contrary to what has been asserted, the assumption was found to be satisfied by both the five-variable 
and the two-variable models. However, the robustness of the test applied did not receive further 
scrutiny. 
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Under this formulation, it becomes possible to (to borrow the expression by 
Shumway, 2001: 102), “exploit each firm’s time series data”. The impact of using 
time-varying covariates on the model can be easily demonstrated via an examination 
of the hazard ratio, as given by: 
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Therefore, unlike conventional proportional hazards models, the hazard ratio in a 
time-dependent model in fact varies with time (via the z(t) component of the 
function)16. With the incorporation of time-varying covariates, the partial likelihood 
function then becomes: 
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Essentially, the implication of this on the coefficient estimation process is that it is 
necessary to find, at each ‘failure time’, the time-dependent covariate values of every 
individual in the risk set. Figure 2 illustrates the distinction between a time-dependent 
proportional hazards model and a conventional proportional hazards model. In 
practice, without high frequency data, it is highly implausible that covariate measures 
                                                 
16
 Thus, while it is common to speak of this model as a time-dependent ‘proportional hazards model’, 
the terminology is not entirely accurate. 
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will have been taken for all individuals in the risk set at every failure time. However, 
as Chen et al. (2005) demonstrated, it is possible to impute a time-dependent covariate 
value at each failure time from the most recent observation17. Indeed, the model has 
the capacity to allow some covariates to be time-dependent while others remain 
invariant with respect to time. 
Figure 2:  
Distinguishing conventional and time-dependent proportional hazards models 
 
Calculation of the likelihood for the failure of Individual A in a conventional model: 
 
 
Calculation the likelihood for the failure of Individual A in a time-dependent model: 
 
 
 
                                                 
17
 For example, in the present study, monthly data was available for the time-dependent covariates. 
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3.5. Why apply time-varying market-wide covariates? 
 
 “As the elapsed time increases [between filing for bankruptcy and its eventual 
resolution], it becomes less likely that the financial condition prior to bankruptcy will 
correlate significantly with the eventual status of these [filing] firms” (Casey et al., 
1986: 254). That being the case, and given that there appeared to be some change in 
the economic climate not properly captured by static market-wide covariates, it would 
be prudent to utilise the most contemporaneous market-wide information at each 
failure time in estimating the model. Indeed, as Wong et al. (2007) contended, the 
possibility of some level of mean reversion in interest rates throughout a firm’s life in 
Chapter 11 could have been a factor in explaining the unexpected sign of the Default 
Spread coefficients estimated in both of the original studies.  
As Section 3.1.3 explained, the parameters of a proportional hazards model are 
estimated based on the partial likelihood function, as given by the product of the 
likelihoods computed at each failure time. The likelihood function itself is the ratio of 
a failed firm’s hazard to the hazard of every other firm in the risk set at that particular 
failure time. The mean reversion argument stated that with the passing of time (or 
more importantly, with each subsequent failure time), Default Spreads and Term 
Spreads in the market would change from their initial levels, as measured prior to 
bankruptcy filing. More specifically, those spreads tended to mean revert (that is wide 
spreads would contract while narrow spreads would expand). Thus, according to this 
argument, a firm faced with a wide Default Spread (representing a high level of credit 
risk in the market) in the month prior to entry into Chapter 11 was likely to be faced 
with an environment of declining spreads (and therefore declining credit risk) 
throughout its duration in Chapter 11 proceedings. Therefore, given the original 
studies operated within a conventional proportional hazards framework, it may 
perhaps not have been so counterintuitive that a wide Default Spread (as measured 
prior to a firm’s entry into Chapter 11) was found to have a negative impact on a 
firm’s hazard of exiting with no value for its shareholders, since that wide Default 
Spread would have been followed by an environment of easing credit risk. The time-
dependent proportional hazards model was proposed to delve into this very issue. 
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It may have been expedient to also utilise time-dependent covariates on a firm-
specific level. However, from a practical standpoint, it was only the market-wide 
covariates for which observations could feasibly be taken throughout each firm’s 
duration in Chapter 11. For a majority of the firms, financial statements were not 
reported during their time in Chapter 11. For those firms which did continue to report, 
there was a high likelihood of bias towards those firms which eventually emerged 
from the proceedings and continued to operate. 
The significance of using a time-dependent proportional hazards model, beyond its 
relaxation of a potentially restrictive assumption, is that it becomes possible, when 
utilised as a predictive model, to engage in ‘real-time’ decision making (Chen et al., 
2005). Whilst the context of Chen et al. (2005) was a medical one, the potential 
application of this model in finance cannot be ignored. Indeed, one of the motivations 
behind the present study was to take one small step in beginning to exploit this 
potential. 
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4. Model building  
 
Before construction of a time-dependent proportional hazards model could begin, it 
was necessary to address one other issue potentially plaguing the Wong et al. (2007) 
model. Specifically, that model was estimated only on the five covariates found to 
have been significant in a small sample study (of 59 firms) conducted by Partington et 
al. (2001), to the peril of the other six covariates introduced in that study. Potentially, 
a restriction of insignificance may have been wrongly imposed on those ignored 
covariates. In order to address this possible misspecification error, a conventional 
proportional hazards model was first estimated using a full set of covariates. 
 
4.1. Model 1: Conventional proportional hazards model with full covariate set 
 
The full set of eleven covariates introduced by Partington et al. (2001) (to be 
discussed in Section 4.3) was applied in a conventional proportional hazards model, 
given by Equation (3.1): 
 
 
( ' )
0( , ) ( ) zt z t e βλ λ=   
 
As per the original studies, the subject under examination was a firm’s hazard of 
exiting from Chapter 11 protection with no value for its existing shareholders. There 
were a multitude of alternative events which could have been examined in the present 
study, and that this was the case speaks to the flexibility of the proportional hazards 
model, and indeed, of survival analysis in general. However, as noted at the outset, the 
motivation behind the present study was to investigate the problems experienced by 
Wong et al. (2007), which may be specific to the event of interest. 
That being the case, a second model was proposed amidst the concerns previously 
outlined regarding the need to properly capture changes in the economic climate. 
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4.2. Model 2: Time-dependent proportional hazards model 
 
A time-dependent proportional hazards model was introduced to the study, as given by 
Equation (3.7): 
  
 
( ' ( ))
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While the market-wide covariates (of Default Spread and Term Spread) were allowed 
to vary with time in this model, the firm-specific covariates remained constant over 
time. 
Following the example of Wong et al. (2007), both models were first estimated on the 
sample of 59 firms from the Partington et al. (2001) study, after which observations 
were incrementally added on a year-by-year basis such that the stability or otherwise 
of the model through time could be examined. 
 
4.3. Covariate set 
 
The covariate set invoked in the present study was drawn from the model proposed by 
Partington et al. (2001). It included a set of two market-wide covariates reflecting the 
economic conditions throughout a firm’s duration in Chapter 11 proceedings as well 
as nine firm-specific covariates representing the financial status of that firm prior to 
its entrance into Chapter 11 protection. 
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4.3.1. Market-wide covariates 
(a) Default Spread 
Default Spread, as given by the Moody’s BAA Corporate Bond Rate less the Treasury 
Bond Rate, provided a measure of the general level of credit risk in the economy. 
While an economic climate of high default risk was expected to increase the hazard of 
a firm exiting Chapter 11 with no value for its shareholders, the experience from the 
original studies has tended to show otherwise.  
 
(b) Term Spread 
Term Spread was calculated by subtracting the Treasury Bill rate (with a term of three 
months) from the Treasury Bond rate (with a term of thirty years) and captured 
business cycle effects. The recognition of such effects has been found to improve the 
predictability of financial distress (for example, Hol, 2007). Term Spread is greatest at 
the trough of a business cycle (when long-term interest rates are high and short-term 
interest rates are low), when the hazard of firm exiting Chapter 11 with no value for 
its shareholders is also expected to be the greatest.  
 
The Default Spread and Term Spread covariates were measured in the month prior to 
a firm’s entry into Chapter 11 for incorporation into Model 1 (the conventional 
proportional hazards model). Further, measurements were also made at regular 
intervals throughout each firm’s life in Chapter 11 for the purposes of estimating 
Model 2 (the time-dependent proportional hazards model). 
 
4.3.2. Firm-specific covariates 
(c) Profitability and funds flow 
The Net Profit to Total Assets ratio and the ratio of EBITD (earnings before interest, 
tax and depreciation) to Total Assets represented the profitability and the funds flow 
received by a firm, respectively. Measures of profitability have often been used in 
predictive models of bankruptcy resolution (for example, Barniv et al., 2002; Li, 
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1999; and Casey et al., 1986). A higher profitability, and likewise greater earnings, 
prior to a firm’s entry into Chapter 11 protection would be expected to diminish its 
hazard of exiting from that protection with no value for its shareholders. 
 
(d) Financial leverage 
Two measures of financial leverage, namely Total Assets to Total Liabilities and the 
ratio of the Total Market Value of Equity to Total Liabilities were included in the 
model. As Partington et al. (2001) noted, leverage has frequently been cited as a 
measure of financial risk, and is positively correlated with the risk of financial distress 
(for example, Ohlson, 1980). Once a firm has entered Chapter 11, high financial 
leverage also increased the debt-holders’ claim on the firm, reducing the value for 
existing shareholders. Thus in the case of both covariates, since a high ratio denoted a 
lower level of leverage, their expected impact on the hazard was negative. 
The interest coverage ratio, as given by EBIT (earnings before interest and tax) on 
Interest Expense, was applied as an alternative proxy for financial leverage and 
reflected the capacity of a firm to meet its interest payments. When this capacity was 
great, the hazard of a firm exiting with no value for its shareholders was expected to 
be low.  
 
(e) Liquidity 
Low levels of short-term liquidity, as measured by Current Assets to Current 
Liabilities, have been associated with the onset of financial distress (for example, 
Ohlson, 1980). However, the impact of liquidity on bankruptcy resolution, and in 
particular the outcome for existing shareholders, is less clear given the role which 
creditors have to play in the Chapter 11 process. 
 
(f) Financial health and quality of management 
The ratio of Total Market Value of Equity to Total Assets was used by Partington et al. 
(2001) as a proxy for the financial health of a firm, in place of the more commonly 
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applied Market Value of Equity to Book Value of Equity. Use of the latter, it was 
contended, would have been problematic due to the presence of negative equity book 
values in the dataset. As an expanded version of the Partington et al. (2001) dataset 
was examined in the present study, this approach has been maintained. A negative 
impact on the hazard was expected. 
 
(g) Firm size  
The natural logarithm of Market Value18 reflected the market’s expectation of the 
existing shareholders’ value outcome from the Chapter 11 proceedings. Thus, its 
impact on the hazard of a firm exiting Chapter 11 with no value for its existing 
shareholders should be negative. 
Partington et al. (2001) proposed an additional accounting measure of firm size (the 
natural logarithm of Total Assets). The view of the literature on the impact of firm size 
has been mixed. White (1981) theorised that larger firms were more likely to 
reorganise rather than liquidate as they had greater capacity for further borrowing. 
However, Li (1999) found that firm size (as proxied by total liabilities) had a negative 
impact on a firm’s hazard of emergence from Chapter 11 protection. Denis and Rogers 
(2007) found that smaller firms spent less time under Chapter 11 protection, but that 
larger firms were more likely to reorganise than to liquidate or be acquired. The 
question was largely an empirical one.  
 
Table 1 summarises the list of covariates to be applied in the proposed models and 
notes their expected impacts on the hazard, together with the signs of the estimated 
coefficients to the Wong et al. (2007) five-variable model. There were a number of 
plausible theories to explain how each of the covariates examined in the present study 
would be expected to affect a firm’s hazard, and some of those have been espoused 
herewith. Indeed, there were also a multitude of theories which highlighted the 
explanatory power of many covariates not examined in this study. However, as was 
                                                 
18
 The market value of a firm is given by the product of its share price and its number of outstanding 
shares. The natural logarithm of market value was taken to control for the wide variation in firm size. 
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the case with the original studies, it was the predictive rather than explanatory abilities 
of the models to be examined which was of interest.  
Table 1: 
 Covariate set and expected coefficient signs 
 
Covariate Expected Sign Wong et al. (2007) 
Market-wide covariates 
Default Spread + - 
Term Spread + + 
Firm-specific covariates 
Net Profit/Total Assets -  
EBITD/Total Assets - - 
Total Assets/Total Liabilities -  
Total Market Value of Equity/Total Liabilities -  
EBIT/Interest Expense -  
Current Assets/Current Liabilities ? - 
Total Market Value of Equity/Total Assets -  
Loge(Market Value) - - 
Loge(Total Assets) ?  
 
List of covariates and their expected effects on a firm’s hazard of exiting from Chapter 11 with no value 
for its shareholders. Wong et al. (2007) refers to the signs on the estimated coefficients to the Wong et 
al. (2007) five-variable model. 
 
 
4.4. Dataset construction 
 
Partington et al. (2001) considered a dataset of 138 Chapter 11 filings during the 
period January 1984 to December 1993 for companies other than financial institutions 
listed on the NYSE, AMEX or NASDAQ. This dataset was subjected to two data 
filters: 
1. The relevant accounting and economic data had to be available19; and 
2. Information as to the outcome20 of the Chapter 11 proceedings had to be 
available. 
                                                 
19
 That is, information necessary for the construction of the eleven covariates. 
20
 This included the date of exit from Chapter 11 proceedings as well as the value outcome to the 
existing shareholders. Wong et al. (2007) explained that this information was extrapolated from 
reorganisation plans, the Dow Jones News Service, other press releases or through direct interviews 
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The application of those filters resulted in a reduced dataset of 59 filing companies. 
In Wong et al. (2007), the authors obtained access to information on an additional 200 
Chapter 11 filings spanning 1993 to 1999. After subjecting these additional filings to 
the two data filters, the authors were able to construct a dataset of 219 filing firms. 
This relatively large dataset was, however, largely a by-product of the nature of the 
Wong et al. (2007) study. In that study, it was possible to apply a much coarser data 
filter since the only financial information required was that which was necessary to 
construct the reduced set of five covariates deemed significant by Partington et al. 
(2001). Given the more extensive set of covariates required by the models proposed in 
the present study, the entire dataset of 338 Chapter 11 filings for the period 1984 to 
1999 had to be reconsidered. 
 
4.4.1. Firm-Specific Covariates 
The following data filters were applied after removing the original set of 59 filing 
companies studied by Partington et al. (2001) for which the full complement of 
information was already available: 
1. Information as to the share price and number of outstanding shares in the 
company on the day prior to filing had to be available21; and 
2. Information as to the outcome of the Chapter 11 proceedings had to be 
available22. 
                                                                                                                                            
with company representatives. Where the return outcome was not available from those sources, the 
closing stock price on the date of exit from Chapter 11 was applied. 
21
 Wong et al. (2007) noted that the share price information required for that study was obtained from 
the Centre for Research in Security Prices (CRSP). Where share price information was not available for 
the day immediately prior to filing for Chapter 11, a price from up to six months prior to filing was 
applied.  
22
 Where only the date of exit from Chapter 11 was known but the value outcome of the proceedings 
was unavailable, the observation in question was not removed from the dataset but was treated as being 
censored on its date of exit, as was the approach in Partington et al. (2001). 
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This resulted in a filtered set of 271 filing firms23. In order to supplement this 
information, DataStream was accessed24 to obtain balance sheet and income statement 
data from Thompson Financial. Consistent with the original studies, this information 
had to have been reported prior to filing for bankruptcy, and could not have been more 
than one year old on the date of filing25. As a result of this process, 67 firms were 
added to the original Partington et al. (2001) 59 firms. As the original studies only 
considered first-time entries into Chapter 11, one observation regarding a firm’s 
second entry into Chapter 11 was subsequently removed. In sum, the Partington et al. 
(2001) set of nine firm-specific covariates was constructed for a total of 125 firms 
which filed for Chapter 11 during the period 1984 to 1999 making up the dataset to be 
examined in the present study (henceforth the “new dataset”)26. 
                                                 
23
 To maintain consistency with the original studies, an observation containing the extreme outlier 
CA/CL value of 53.84 was also removed from the study. 
24
 Via the Thompson One Banker interface. 
25
 For a number of firms, Thompson Financial published reports which were released after a Chapter 11 
petition had been filed. In some cases, it may have been expedient to utilise information from the 
earliest of those reports, thus incorporating into each model a more contemporaneous reflection of a 
firm’s financial status at the time of bankruptcy filing. Indeed, it was not improbable that financial 
reports released shortly after a firm had filed for Chapter 11 would have been compiled prior to that 
filing. However, as Denis and Rogers (2007) noted, specific directions of change in a firm’s financial 
structure during its time under Chapter 11 protection could improve its likelihood of emergence. Since 
it was not possible to objectively distinguish between those post-filing reports which merely provided a 
more contemporaneous reflection of a firm’s filing date status and those which disclosed the 
implementation of strategies for structural change, the inclusion of data from reports released after the 
date of bankruptcy filing could have biased the study and, to use the expression of Ohlson (1980), led 
to a “back-casting” model. More generally, however, the decision not to include this data was made 
with the recognition of a need to maintain consistency with the original studies and more importantly, 
with the 59 Partington et al. (2001) companies which did not require financial information to be 
collected in this manner. 
26
 Among the 125 observations in the new dataset, there were three observations for which information 
on a number of firm-specific covariates was not available. These ‘incomplete data’ observations were 
maintained in the new dataset since the proportional hazards model has to capacity to remove from its 
estimation process all observations containing missing values. Further, all three observations were able 
to re-enter the estimation process in subsequent (streamlined) specifications of the model (see for 
example the three-variable model in Section 5.2.2). The descriptive statistics and correlation matrices 
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4.4.2. Market-wide covariates 
The market-wide covariates of Default Spread and Term Spread were constructed 
using data from the US Federal Reserve, which provides information on a selection of 
interest rates on a monthly basis. While Default Spread and Terms Spread 
observations required for the conventional proportional hazards modelling conducted 
in Wong et al. (2007) were already available for many of the firms in the dataset, the 
present study also required the use of time-varying interest rate data. Thus, in the 
interest of consistency, US Federal Reserve data was used in the construction of all 
Default Spread and Term Spread covariates. In line with the original studies, Default 
Spread was defined as the Moody’s BAA corporate bond rate less the Treasury Bond 
rate, while Term Spread was calculated by subtracting the Treasury Bill rate from the 
Treasury Bond rate. The nominal 30-year and three-month constant maturity US 
Treasury Securities rates were applied as the Treasury Bond and Treasury Bill rates, 
respectively27. 
Monthly interest rate data was collected for each firm for a period spanning from one 
month prior to filing for Chapter 11 to the month of exit from Chapter 11. In order to 
estimate the conventional proportional hazards model, Default Spread and Term 
Spread covariates from the month prior to filing for Chapter 11 were applied, as per 
the approach taken by the original studies. For the time-varying Default Spread and 
Term Spread model, it was assumed that the interest rates were collected monthly for 
                                                                                                                                            
set out in the present study were based on all 125 observations (with observations removed on a 
covariate-by-covariate basis). 
27
 These definitions generated Treasury Bond and Treasury Bill rates that were the most similar, but not 
equal, to those used in the original studies. A comparison of market-wide covariates based on the 
Partington et al. (2001) set of 59 companies found that the descriptive statistics of the new Default and 
Term Spreads remained qualitatively similar to those reported in Partington et al. (2001).  
An estimation of the proportional hazards model on those 59 companies found that the estimated 
coefficient on Term Spread became insignificant when the new interest rates were applied (see Table 5 
and Table 8). All other estimated coefficients remained qualitatively similar to Partington et al. (2001). 
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each individual firm on the day of the month when that firm entered Chapter 1128. 
Once all firms were aligned in event time, this assumption was instrumental in 
simplifying the estimation of the time-dependent model. Essentially, all interest rate 
measures were assumed to have been observed on the first day of each event month. 
Thus, when likelihoods were calculated at each failure time, it was possible to apply 
the month N Default Spread and Term Spread observations for every firm in the risk 
set (where N was the same for all firms and represented the event month in which the 
relevant failure fell)29, 30. 
 
4.4.3. Descriptive statistics 
Table 2 outlines the descriptive statistics for the new dataset. Notably, the negative 
mean values of Net Profit/Total Assets and EBITD/Total Assets indicated that firms 
filing for Chapter 11 were, on average, operating at a loss. Further, a mean 
loge(Market Value) of 2.35, or a mean market value of $10.5 million, suggested that 
the examined firms were among the smallest listed on the NYSE, AMEX or 
NASDAQ31. On average, a firm spent 481 days in Chapter 11, though this duration 
was highly deviant and ranged from 28 days to 1789 days. 
 
                                                 
28
 For example, Smith International filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy on 7 March 1986. Under this 
assumption, the interest rates for March 1986 would be used to calculate the Default Spread and Term 
Spread prevalent at the beginning of Smith International’s first month under Chapter 11 protection, 
April 1986 interest rates would apply from 7 April 1986, and so forth. 
29
 For a more in-depth discussion on the use of the partial likelihood method in estimating a time-
varying proportional hazards model, see Section 3.1.3. 
30
 This assumption was subsequently altered when calendar-time modelling was applied. 
31
 Similar findings were made by Wong et al. (2007) in relation to their estimation sample. 
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Table 2: 
Descriptive Statistics 
 
Variable Mean Std Dev Minimum Maximum 
Default Spread 1.68 0.38 1.20 2.77 
Term Spread 1.96 1.23 0.17 4.60 
Net Profit/Total Assets -0.23 0.46 -3.83 0.10 
EBITD/Total Assets -0.11 0.34 -2.54 0.35 
Total Assets/Total Liabilities 1.21 0.57 0.15 3.98 
MV/Total Liabilities 0.21 0.43 0.00 2.53 
EBIT/Interest Expense -1,199.15 11,732.55 -129,877.50 18.13 
CA/CL 1.27 1.48 0.02 13.55 
MV/Total Assets 0.17 0.36 0.00 2.59 
Loge(MV) 2.35 1.33 -0.63 5.49 
Loge(Total Assets) 5.05 1.48 1.25 8.94 
Number of Days in Chapter 11 481.14 325.22 28 1789 
 
Descriptive statistics for the 125 observations in the new dataset. Missing values were excluded from 
the calculations. Default Spread is the Moody’s BAA Corporate Bond Rate less the Treasury Bond 
Rate; Term Spread is the Treasury Bond rate less the Treasury Bill rate; Net Profit/Total Assets is the 
firm’s net profit divided by its total assets; EBITD/Total Assets is the firm’s earnings before interest, 
tax and depreciation divided by its total assets; Total Assets/Total Liabilities is the ratio of the firm’s 
total assets to its total liabilities; MV/Total Liabilities is the ratio of the firm’s market capitalisation to 
its total liabilities; EBIT/Interest Expense is the firm’s earnings before interest and tax divided by its 
interest expense; CA/CL is the ratio of the firm’s current assets to its current liabilities; MV/Total 
Assets is the ratio of the firm’s market capitalisation to its total assets; loge(MV) is the natural log of 
the firm’s market capitalisation; loge(Total Assets) is the natural log of the firm’s total assets; Number 
of days in Chapter 11 is the number of days between the firm’s date of filing and its date of exit from 
Chapter 11 proceedings. All covariates were measured prior to the firm’s entry into Chapter 11. 
 
4.4.4. Some issues for consideration 
While the dataset examined in the present study was significantly smaller than that 
used in Wong et al. (2007), its size remained on a par with other survival analysis 
studies of Chapter 11 resolution. The model in Wong et al. (2007) was estimated on an 
estimation sample of 125 firms, Orbe et al. (2002) and Li (1999) examined the same 
set of 83 filing firms, while Bandopadhyaya (1994) utilised a dataset of 74 firms. 
Indeed, the same assertion could be made with respect to studies of Chapter 11 
resolution in general. For instance, Barniv et al. (2002) estimated its model on 114 
firms (out of a dataset of 237), while 118 firms were examined by Casey et al. (1986). 
Perhaps of greater concern, however, was the proportion of the total number of (338) 
observations that the new dataset represented. As Table 3 demonstrates, only 37% of 
the total number of Chapter 11 filing observations was available for model estimation. 
As Zmijewski (1984) highlighted in relation to traditional predictive models of 
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financial distress, where firms with incomplete data were not randomly distributed in 
the population but may be informative, the imposition of data filters may bias the 
study. In the context of the present study, where information from DataStream was 
unavailable, not by virtue of non-publication by the database but due to a highly 
distressed firm’s failure to report, the sample may be biased away from firms which 
exited Chapter 11 with no value for their existing shareholders. 
Table 3: 
Sample Description 
 
Number of Firms Percentage
All Observations 338 100%
less: Missing information on market capitalisation (49)
less: Missing information on Chapter 11 outcome* (17)
less: Observation containing CA/CL extreme outlier** (1)
Subtotal 271 80%
less: Firm-specific covariates unavailable^ (146)
less: Economy-wide covariates unavailable 0
New Dataset 125 37%
 
 
The dataset construction process is described. All Observations refers to the set of all Chapter 11 filings 
from 1984 to 1999 available to the original studies. New Dataset refers to the sample of observations 
examined in the present study. 
* Where the date of exit from Chapter 11 was known but the value outcome was unknown, the 
corresponding observation was maintained in the sample to be censored by the model. This was 
consistent with the approach in the original studies. 
** This was in line with the approach original studies. 
^ Three observations containing missing firm-specific covariate values were not removed from the 
sample since they included information on all firm-specific covariates necessary for a number of 
subsequent specifications of the model.  
 
 
Table 4: 
Percentage Failures 
 
All Observations New Dataset
Number of failures 213 67
Number of observations censored 125 58
Total number of observations 338 125
Percentage failures 63% 54%
Percentage censored 37% 46%
 
 
Comparison of the percentage of failures between All Observations (all available information on 
Chapter 11 filings from 1984-1999) and New Dataset (the 125 observations examined in the present 
study). Failure is defined as an exit from Chapter 11 with no value for existing shareholders. All other 
observations are censored. 
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As Table 4 shows, there was a noticeable bias in the new dataset against firms which 
eventually emerged from Chapter 11 protection with no value for shareholders. The 
bias created in constructing this dataset was, by virtue of the need to examine a 
complete covariate set, unavoidable. However, the nature of the present study, and the 
effects of a data-induced bias on it, should be distinguished from the probit analysis 
context within which Zmijewski’s (1984) concerns were raised. Nevertheless, it 
would not be prudent to dismiss this issue. 
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5. Results 
 
5.1. Preliminary Results 
 
The conventional proportional hazards model (Model 1) and the time-dependent 
model (Model 2) were estimated using the new dataset of 125 firms, with observations 
added to the Partington et al. (2001) 59 firms on a yearly basis. The estimated 
parameters of the models and their respective p-values (based on chi-squared 
statistics)32 are shown in Table 5 and Table 6. 
 
5.1.1. Model 1: Conventional proportional hazards model 
This model was proposed to address a potential misspecification error in the Wong et 
al. (2007) model. A cursory inspection of Table 5 would disclose that in various sub-
periods throughout the study, a number of covariates outside of the Wong et al. (2007) 
model were indeed found to be significant determinants of the hazard. However, the 
composition of the significant covariate set continued to be sensitive to the period 
under examination33. Essentially, the unobserved heterogeneity in the data underlying 
the Wong et al. (2007) model was to remain unobserved despite the incorporation of 
additional covariates.  
In general terms, most of the significant coefficients were of their expected signs. The 
profitability ratio (Net Profit/Total Assets), as measured prior to entry into Chapter 11, 
had a negative impact on a firm’s hazard of emergence with no value for shareholders. 
The negative coefficients on the market value and financial health covariates (with the 
latter proxied by Market Value/Total Assets) were also expected. The coefficient on 
                                                 
32
 The p-values were based on a Wald test-statistics as given by the squared ratio of the estimated 
coefficient to its estimated standard error. 
33
 While the number of statistically significant covariates was not large, this result was consistent with 
the finding in Barniv et al. (2002) that statistically significant covariates in models predicting the onset 
of financial distress were not always significant determinants of bankruptcy outcome. 
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Current Assets/Current Liabilities was also negative, suggesting that a more liquid 
firm had a lower hazard of emerging with no value for its existing shareholders.  
The experience with the second earnings covariate (EBITD/Total Assets) was less 
pedestrian. The EBITD/Total Assets covariate had a particularly significant economic 
impact (in the expected direction) on the hazard when estimated on the sub-sample of 
59 Partington et al. (2001) firms, covering the period 1984 to 1993, but was rendered 
insignificant with the addition of observations from subsequent years, only to re-
emerge as a significant covariate with an unexpected positive coefficient when 
observations from 1997 and 1998 were finally added34. This change in direction may 
be explained by the potentially high correlation between this covariate and Net 
Profit/Total Assets, which was also significant (but with a negative coefficient) during 
the anomalous periods. To foreshadow subsequent events, this issue was to become a 
precursor to further inquiries. 
Also contrary to expectations, the Market Value/Total Liabilities covariate was found 
to have a positive impact on the hazard in the sub-periods during which its estimated 
coefficient was significant. A high Market Value/Total Liabilities ratio implied a low 
level of financial leverage and should therefore reflect a smaller number of claims by 
firm’s debt-holders, thus improving the position of the existing shareholders. 
Interestingly, neither of the alternative measures of financial leverage (Total 
Assets/Total Liabilities and EBIT/Interest Expense) were significant determinants of 
the hazard. It was therefore possible that the Market Value/Total Liabilities covariate 
may have been capturing some other effects. 
Default Spread was the only covariate to have been consistently significant 
throughout the sample period, while Term Spread was consistently insignificant. As 
per the experience in the original studies, the Default Spread covariate was found to 
have a negative impact on the hazard. In order to further investigate this result, and 
the merits of a mean reversion explanation to this phenomenon, a time-dependent 
proportional hazards model was estimated. 
                                                 
34
 Interestingly, 1997 and 1998 fell outside the period covered by the Wong et al. (2007) estimation 
sample. 
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Table 5: 
Model 1: Conventional proportional hazards model 
 
PRST 1984-1993 1984-1994 1984-1995 1984-1996 1984-1997 1984-1998 1984-1999
Default Spread -3.29 ** -1.54 * -1.79 ** -1.73 ** -2.03 ** -1.77 ** -1.48 ** -1.26 **
(0.00) (0.08) (0.03) (0.02) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Term Spread 0.13 0.20 0.11 0.11 -0.01 -0.08 0.00 -0.16
(0.63) (0.42) (0.62) (0.56) (0.96) (0.63) (1.00) (0.21)
Net Profit/Total Assets 0.06 -1.29 -4.43 -4.45 -6.19 ** -7.84 ** -6.03 ** -0.84
(0.99) (0.78) (0.20) (0.19) (0.03) (0.00) (0.00) (0.45)
EBITD/Total Assets -19.03 ** -4.32 0.57 0.26 2.49 6.81 ** 4.96 ** 0.38
(0.04) (0.48) (0.89) (0.95) (0.46) (0.01) (0.01) (0.80)
Total Assets/Total Liabilities -0.21 0.00 0.18 0.25 0.40 0.08 0.44 0.23
(0.77) (1.00) (0.74) (0.63) (0.36) (0.83) (0.18) (0.45)
MV/Total Liabilities 1.58 2.04 2.64 ** 2.31 * 2.14 * 2.57 ** 0.87 0.45
(0.62) (0.21) (0.04) (0.07) (0.08) (0.03) (0.26) (0.43)
EBIT/Interest Expense 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
(0.55) (0.62) (0.67) (0.66) (0.73) (0.55) (0.75) (0.81)
CA/CL -0.97 -0.77 -0.84 * -0.72 -0.78 * -0.13 -0.13 -0.14
(0.11) (0.10) (0.07) (0.10) (0.06) (0.17) (0.20) (0.17)
MV/Total Assets -0.81 -1.19 -2.23 * -2.22 * -2.75 ** -2.86 ** -1.80 ** -0.04
(0.63) (0.46) (0.08) (0.08) (0.02) (0.00) (0.02) (0.96)
ln(MV) -0.75 -0.61 * -0.56 * -0.51 -0.42 -0.63 ** -0.47 ** -0.42 **
(0.11) (0.09) (0.09) (0.12) (0.19) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
ln(Total Assets) -0.12 -0.18 -0.20 -0.26 -0.29 -0.11 0.03 0.09
(0.78) (0.57) (0.53) (0.42) (0.33) (0.67) (0.88) (0.64)
Observations 59 69 74 76 82 93 109 125
(59) (69) (74) (76) (81) (91) (106) (122)
 
 
** significant at 5%, * significant at 10%. 
Coefficient estimates (with p-values in parentheses) for the eleven covariates proposed by Partington et al. (2001). PRST represents the sample of 59 firms examined by 
Partington et al. (2001) spanning the period 1984-1993. Data was added to the sample on a yearly basis. The remaining columns are labelled according to the period covered 
by the sample. The number of observations in each sample is noted (with the number of observations with complete data in parentheses). Default Spread is the Moody’s BAA 
Corporate Bond Rate less the Treasury Bond Rate; Term Spread is the Treasury Bond rate less the Treasury Bill rate; Net Profit/Total Assets is the firm’s net profit divided by 
its total assets; EBITD/Total Assets is the firm’s earnings before interest, tax and depreciation divided by its total assets; Total Assets/Total Liabilities is the ratio of the firm’s 
total assets to its total liabilities; MV/Total Liabilities is the ratio of the firm’s market capitalisation to its total liabilities; EBIT/Interest Expense is the firm’s earnings before 
interest and tax divided by its interest expense; CA/CL is the ratio of the firm’s current assets to its current liabilities; MV/Total Assets is the ratio of the firm’s market 
capitalisation to its total assets; ln(MV) is the natural log of the firm’s market capitalisation; ln(Total Assets) is the natural log of the firm’s total assets. All covariates were 
measured prior to the firm’s entry into Chapter 11. 
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Table 6: 
Model 2: Time-dependent proportional hazards model 
 
PRST 1984-1993 1984-1994 1984-1995 1984-1996 1984-1997 1984-1998 1984-1999
Default Spread -4.72 ** -3.30 ** -3.19 ** -2.60 ** -2.69 ** -0.91 -1.14 ** -0.57
(0.03) (0.04) (0.04) (0.05) (0.02) (0.20) (0.02) (0.18)
Term Spread -0.24 -0.34 -0.33 -0.33 * -0.37 ** -0.30 ** -0.32 ** -0.35 **
(0.40) (0.14) (0.12) (0.08) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.00)
Net Profit/Total Assets 0.88 -1.90 -4.34 -4.76 * -5.43 ** -7.79 ** -5.50 ** -0.18
(0.84) (0.62) (0.15) (0.10) (0.03) (0.00) (0.00) (0.87)
EBITD/Total Assets -15.54 * -3.41 0.54 0.66 1.61 6.63 ** 4.44 ** -0.48
(0.06) (0.50) (0.88) (0.85) (0.60) (0.00) (0.01) (0.75)
Total Assets/Total Liabilities 0.10 0.24 0.30 0.46 0.40 0.23 0.62 * 0.46
(0.87) (0.69) (0.58) (0.36) (0.36) (0.52) (0.06) (0.13)
MV/Total Liabilities 1.29 1.86 2.28 2.01 1.99 2.54 ** 0.53 0.06
(0.69) (0.28) (0.11) (0.15) (0.11) (0.03) (0.52) (0.92)
EBIT/Interest Expenditure 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
(0.96) (0.40) (0.44) (0.38) (0.48) (0.31) (0.47) (0.44)
CA/CL -1.39 ** -0.74 -0.75 -0.61 -0.66 * -0.13 -0.13 -0.13
(0.04) (0.12) (0.11) (0.16) (0.08) (0.14) (0.17) (0.16)
MV/Total Assets -0.10 -0.87 -1.70 -1.63 -1.95 * -2.28 ** -1.26 0.55
(0.95) (0.54) (0.15) (0.15) (0.06) (0.01) (0.10) (0.41)
ln(MV) -0.71 -0.65 * -0.64 * -0.67 ** -0.59 * -0.84 ** -0.50 ** -0.49 **
(0.11) (0.07) (0.06) (0.04) (0.06) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00)
ln(Total Assets) 0.00 -0.06 -0.06 -0.04 -0.06 0.10 0.08 0.16
(0.99) (0.86) (0.85) (0.88) (0.83) (0.69) (0.71) (0.38)
Observations 59 69 74 76 82 93 109 125
(59) (69) (74) (76) (81) (91) (106) (122)
 
 
** significant at 5%, * significant at 10%. 
Coefficient estimates (with p-values in parentheses) for the eleven covariates proposed by Partington et al. (2001). PRST represents the sample of 59 firms examined by 
Partington et al. (2001) spanning the period 1984-1993. Data was added to the sample on a yearly basis. The remaining columns are labelled according to the period covered 
by the sample. The number of observations in each sample is noted (with the number of observations with complete data in parentheses). Default Spread is the Moody’s BAA 
Corporate Bond Rate less the Treasury Bond Rate; Term Spread is the Treasury Bond rate less the Treasury Bill rate; Net Profit/Total Assets is the firm’s net profit divided by 
its total assets; EBITD/Total Assets is the firm’s earnings before interest, tax and depreciation divided by its total assets; Total Assets/Total Liabilities is the ratio of the firm’s 
total assets to its total liabilities; MV/Total Liabilities is the ratio of the firm’s market capitalisation to its total liabilities; EBIT/Interest Expense is the firm’s earnings before 
interest and tax divided by its interest expense; CA/CL is the ratio of the firm’s current assets to its current liabilities; MV/Total Assets is the ratio of the firm’s market 
capitalisation to its total assets; ln(MV) is the natural log of the firm’s market capitalisation; ln(Total Assets) is the natural log of the firm’s total assets. Default Spread and 
Term Spread were measured monthly for the duration of the firm’s Chapter 11 proceedings; all other covariates were measured prior to the firm’s entry into Chapter 11. 
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5.1.2. Model 2: Time-dependent proportional hazards model 
On the whole, the time-dependent proportional hazards model produced similar 
findings to the conventional model but, as Table 6 demonstrates, also generated some 
unexpected results. As was the case in the conventional model, Net Profit/Total 
Assets, Current Assets/Current Liabilities, Market Value/Total Assets and loge(Market 
Value), when significant, were all found to have a negative impact on the hazard. 
Likewise, the anomalous EBITD/Total Assets result continued from the conventional 
model into this model. As in Model 1, the estimated coefficient on Market Value/Total 
Liabilities was positive, contrary to expectations. However, in this model, this 
counter-intuitive result was supported by a positive coefficient to Total Assets/Total 
Liabilities (another measure of leverage), though that covariate was only statistically 
significant in one sub-period.  
Perhaps the most surprising result, or more accurately the lack thereof, was the role 
that the time-varying market-wide covariates were to play in this model. Despite the 
non-remittent protestations of ‘wrong signs’ on Default Spread, this seemingly 
anomalous result remained unrectified even after being assailed with a model targeted 
at the very issue. It also became quite apparent that the structural instability of the 
Wong et al. (2007) model could not be remedied by a recalibration of the model to 
account for the changing economic conditions throughout each firm’s life in Chapter 
11 proceedings. 
Nevertheless, the results produced by the time-dependent proportional hazards model 
raised several other matters which warranted further investigation. In particular, the 
‘switch’ in significance which appeared to occur between the Default Spread and the 
Term Spread covariates suggested some level of multicollinearity in the model. 
Default Spread and Term Spread were, by their construction, very closely aligned. 
Coefficients which are sensitive to the estimation sample (with large swings caused by 
small changes in the data) are known to be symptomatic of multicollinearity (see for 
example, Gujarati, 1988)35. Indeed, the results with respect to the EBITD/Total Assets 
                                                 
35
 While the proportional hazards model is not itself a linear model (being those models affected by 
multicollinearity), the covariates relate in a linear manner which can be observed when the natural 
logarithm of the hazard function is taken: 
0log [ ( , )] log [ ( )] 'e et z t zλ λ β= + . 
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covariate, and that covariate’s potentially high correlation with Net Profit/Total 
Assets, would only lend support to this contention. 
 
5.2. Stamping out multicollinearity 
 
A correlation matrix of the eleven covariates in the model was constructed for the 
entire sample36. As expected, and as Table 7 shows, there was some degree of 
correlation among the covariates in the present study. On a pair-wise level, the 
strongest correlation was between Net Profit/Total Assets and EBITD/Total Assets 
which shared a correlation coefficient of 0.9537. It was not surprising, therefore, that 
in certain sub-samples the coefficient on EBITD/Total Assets had to change signs to 
offset the effect of an equally significant Net Profit/Total Assets coefficient. In 
addition, a condition index of 29.90 among the eleven covariates suggested the 
presence of moderate to strong multicollinearity38. 
In response to these findings, Models 1 and 2 were re-estimated using a stepwise 
covariate selection process. 
 
                                                 
36
 Default Spread and Term Spread observations were those used in Model 1 (the conventional model). 
37
 Gujarati (1988) suggested that as a ‘rule of thumb’, multicollinearity was a serious problem when the 
pair-wise correlation coefficient between two covariates was greater than 0.8. 
38
 The condition index is given by the square root of the ratio of the maximum eigenvalue to the 
minimum eigenvalue. Gujarati (1988) suggested that as a ‘rule of thumb’, a condition index of 10 to 30 
was indicative of moderate to strong multicollinearity with a condition index in excess of 30 pointing to 
severe multicollinearity. 
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Table 7: 
Correlation Matrix 
 
Default Spread Term Spread Net Profit/TA EBITD/TA TA/TL MV/TL EBIT/Interest CA/CL MV/TA ln(MV) ln(TA)
Default Spread 1 -0.35 ** -0.06 -0.02 -0.08 -0.03 0.04 -0.07 -0.03 0.02 0.06
(0.00) (0.52) (0.81) (0.36) (0.70) (0.66) (0.43) (0.73) (0.79) (0.52)
Term Spread -0.35 ** 1 0.26 ** 0.27 ** -0.10 -0.12 -0.04 -0.13 -0.05 -0.01 0.01
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.29) (0.17) (0.64) (0.14) (0.62) (0.93) (0.93)
Net Profit/TA -0.06 0.26 ** 1 0.95 ** 0.26 ** -0.14 -0.01 0.12 -0.31 ** -0.03 0.26 **
(0.52) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.11) (0.91) (0.19) (0.00) (0.74) (0.00)
EBITD/TA -0.02 0.27 ** 0.95 ** 1 0.17 * -0.16 * 0.00 0.09 -0.22 ** -0.02 0.24 **
(0.81) (0.00) (0.00) (0.06) (0.07) (1.00) (0.34) (0.02) (0.81) (0.01)
TA/TL -0.08 -0.10 0.26 ** 0.17 * 1 0.47 ** 0.06 0.26 ** 0.03 -0.01 -0.18 **
(0.36) (0.29) (0.00) (0.06) (0.00) (0.53) (0.00) (0.75) (0.95) (0.05)
MV/TL -0.03 -0.12 -0.14 -0.16 * 0.47 ** 1 0.02 0.06 0.70 ** 0.15 * -0.44 **
(0.70) (0.17) (0.11) (0.07) (0.00) (0.83) (0.49) (0.00) (0.09) (0.00)
EBIT/Interest 0.04 -0.04 -0.01 0.00 0.06 0.02 1 0.01 0.02 -0.07 -0.06
(0.66) (0.64) (0.91) (1.00) (0.53) (0.83) (0.90) (0.86) (0.46) (0.51)
CA/CL -0.07 -0.13 0.12 0.09 0.26 ** 0.06 0.01 1 -0.06 -0.03 0.03
(0.43) (0.14) (0.19) (0.34) (0.00) (0.49) (0.90) (0.48) (0.72) (0.75)
MV/TA -0.03 -0.05 -0.31 ** -0.22 ** 0.03 0.70 ** 0.02 -0.06 1 0.13 -0.50 **
(0.73) (0.62) (0.00) (0.02) (0.75) (0.00) (0.86) (0.48) (0.16) (0.00)
ln(MV) 0.02 -0.01 -0.03 -0.02 -0.01 0.15 * -0.07 -0.03 0.13 1 0.60 **
(0.79) (0.93) (0.74) (0.81) (0.95) (0.09) (0.46) (0.72) (0.16) (0.00)
ln(TA) 0.06 0.01 0.26 ** 0.24 ** -0.18 ** -0.44 ** -0.06 0.03 -0.50 ** 0.60 ** 1
(0.52) (0.93) (0.00) (0.01) (0.05) (0.00) (0.51) (0.75) (0.00) (0.00)
 
** significant at 5%, * significant at 10%. 
Correlation coefficients (with p-values in parentheses) between the eleven covariates proposed by Partington et al. (2001) for all observations from 1984-1999. Default 
Spread is the Moody’s BAA Corporate Bond Rate less the Treasury Bond Rate; Term Spread is the Treasury Bond rate less the Treasury Bill rate; Net Profit/TA is the firm’s 
net profit divided by its total assets; EBITD/TA is the firm’s earnings before interest, tax and depreciation divided by its total assets; TA/TL is the ratio of the firm’s total 
assets to its total liabilities; MV/TL is the ratio of the firm’s market capitalisation to its total liabilities; EBIT/Interest is the firm’s earnings before interest and tax divided by 
its interest expense; CA/CL is the ratio of the firm’s current assets to its current liabilities; MV/TA is the ratio of the firm’s market capitalisation to its total assets; ln(MV) is 
the natural log of the firm’s market capitalisation; ln(TA) is the natural log of the firm’s total assets. All covariates were measured prior to the firm’s entry into Chapter 11.
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5.2.1. Stepwise selection 
The forward stepwise covariate selection procedure is one means of constructing a 
‘clean’ or parsimonious model. By only including in it those covariates which are 
significant, it is also a way of combating the confounding effects caused by correlated 
covariates. 
In the stepwise selection process utilised in the present study, the model began with no 
covariates. Chi-squared statistics were computed for each covariate in the available 
set. The largest of these was compared to the critical value at the prescribed level of 
significance (in this case 10%) and if significant, the corresponding covariate was 
added to the model. In this way, additional covariates were sequentially added to the 
model. However, it was also possible for covariates to drop out of that model.  After 
each step, the covariates in the model were reassessed for their significance. Thus, 
after each addition or elimination, incumbent covariates would drop out of the model 
if they failed to maintain the prescribed level of significance. The process was 
terminated when no further covariates could be entered into the model or when the 
latest entry was the only covariate to be eliminated upon reassessment of the model. 
The results in Table 8 and Table 9 demonstrate that some level of parsimony was 
indeed achieved in both models through the stepwise selection of covariates. From 
Table 8, it can be seen that, at the 10% level of significance, the conventional 
proportional hazard model now consisted of two consistently significant covariates (in 
Default Spread and loge(Market Value)) and, in all sub-periods, one earnings or 
profitability measure39. Appearances continued to be made by the negative Current 
Assets/Current Liabilities coefficients as well as the seemingly counterintuitive 
positive Market Value/Total Liabilities coefficients40. 
                                                 
39
 That a profitability or an earnings covariate was significant throughout the sample period, contrary 
to what was found in Wong et al. (2007), may be attributed to the differences in datasets examined. 
When the Wong et al. (2007) model was re-estimated using the new dataset (see Appendix A), the 
EBITD/Total Assets covariate was found to be significant (at 10%) throughout the sample period. 
40
 When carried out at the 5% level of significance (see Appendix B), the results were largely similar 
though with the Current Assets/Current Liabilities and Market Value/Total Liabilities covariates the 
primary casualties. 
   
59 
Table 8: 
Stepwise selection estimation of Model 1 
 
PRST 1984-1993 1984-1994 1984-1995 1984-1996 1984-1997 1984-1998 1984-1999
Default Spread -3.14 -1.72 -2.02 -2.09 -2.18 -1.88 -1.43 -1.08
Term Spread
Net Profit/Total Assets -1.13 -1.15 -0.54
EBITD/Total Assets -19.24 -4.69 -3.67 -4.00 -3.92
Total Assets/Total Liabilities
MV/Total Liabilities 1.72 1.57 1.44
EBIT/Interest Expenditure
CA/CL -0.93 -0.67 -0.62 -0.50
MV/Total Assets
ln(MV) -0.84 -0.62 -0.62 -0.70 -0.58 -0.49 -0.40 -0.33
ln(Total Assets)
Observations 59 69 74 76 82 93 109 125
(59) (69) (74) (76) (81) (91) (106) (122)
 
 
Forward stepwise estimation (at a 10% level of significance) based on the eleven covariates proposed by Partington et al. (2001). PRST represents the sample of 59 firms 
examined by Partington et al. (2001) spanning the period 1984-1993. Data was added to the sample on a yearly basis. The remaining columns are labelled according to the 
period covered by the sample. The number of observations in each sample is noted (with the number of observations with complete data in parentheses). Default Spread is the 
Moody’s BAA Corporate Bond Rate less the Treasury Bond Rate; Term Spread is the Treasury Bond rate less the Treasury Bill rate; Net Profit/Total Assets is the firm’s net 
profit divided by its total assets; EBITD/Total Assets is the firm’s earnings before interest, tax and depreciation divided by its total assets; Total Assets/Total Liabilities is the 
ratio of the firm’s total assets to its total liabilities; MV/Total Liabilities is the ratio of the firm’s market capitalisation to its total liabilities; EBIT/Interest Expense is the 
firm’s earnings before interest and tax divided by its interest expense; CA/CL is the ratio of the firm’s current assets to its current liabilities; MV/Total Assets is the ratio of 
the firm’s market capitalisation to its total assets; ln(MV) is the natural log of the firm’s market capitalisation; ln(Total Assets) is the natural log of the firm’s total assets. All 
covariates were measured prior to the firm’s entry into Chapter 11. 
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Table 9: 
Stepwise selection estimation of Model 2 
 
PRST 1984-1993 1984-1994 1984-1995 1984-1996 1984-1997 1984-1998 1984-1999
Default Spread -3.03815 -3.78582 -3.0181 -1.29298 -0.91384
Term Spread -0.51364 -0.39991 -0.3371 -0.31502 -0.22741
Net Profit/Total Assets -2.08625 -2.12102 -4.05241 -1.17415 -1.16259
EBITD/Total Assets -15.23853 -5.62448 -0.55482
Total Assets/Total Liabilities
MV/Total Liabilities 2.31353
EBIT/Interest Expenditure
CA/CL -1.31706 -0.51677
MV/Total Assets -1.62128
ln(MV) -0.71043 -0.70163 -0.60772 -0.6066 -0.66483 -0.53742 -0.42603 -0.33456
ln(Total Assets)
Observations 59 69 74 76 82 93 109 125
(59) (69) (74) (76) (81) (91) (106) (122)
 
 
Forward stepwise estimation (at a 10% level of significance) based on the eleven covariates proposed by Partington et al. (2001). PRST represents the sample of 59 firms 
examined by Partington et al. (2001) spanning the period 1984-1993. Data was added to the sample on a yearly basis. The remaining columns are labelled according to the 
period covered by the sample. The number of observations in each sample is noted (with the number of observations with complete data in parentheses). Default Spread is the 
Moody’s BAA Corporate Bond Rate less the Treasury Bond Rate; Term Spread is the Treasury Bond rate less the Treasury Bill rate; Net Profit/Total Assets is the firm’s net 
profit divided by its total assets; EBITD/Total Assets is the firm’s earnings before interest, tax and depreciation divided by its total assets; Total Assets/Total Liabilities is the 
ratio of the firm’s total assets to its total liabilities; MV/Total Liabilities is the ratio of the firm’s market capitalisation to its total liabilities; EBIT/Interest Expense is the 
firm’s earnings before interest and tax divided by its interest expense; CA/CL is the ratio of the firm’s current assets to its current liabilities; MV/Total Assets is the ratio of 
the firm’s market capitalisation to its total assets; ln(MV) is the natural log of the firm’s market capitalisation; ln(Total Assets) is the natural log of the firm’s total assets. 
Default Spread and Term Spread were measured monthly for the duration of the firm’s Chapter 11 proceedings; all other covariates are measured prior to the firm’s entry into 
Chapter 11. 
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As Table 9 shows, the time-dependent proportional hazards model was similar in 
composition to its conventional counterpart in terms of a consistently significant 
loge(Market Value) covariate as well as the significance of either a profitability or an 
earnings measure throughout the sample period. The 1984-1996 sub-period, saw a 
particularly crowded covariate set. However, perhaps even more intriguing was the 
instability in the market-wide covariates. Default Spread in particular was volatile 
both in the statistical significance of its coefficients as well as their magnitudes41.  
This lead concerning the volatility of the Default Spread covariate will be more 
closely considered the deeper this investigation ventures. In the interim, however, the 
experience in both models, particularly in terms of the ‘switch’ in significance 
between the profitability and the earnings measures, suggested that there was a need 
to explicitly control for multicollinearity. 
 
5.2.2. Streamlining the model 
The correlation matrix from Table 7 was reconsidered. Beginning with Default 
Spread, loge(Market Value) and EBITD/Total Assets, the three primary components of 
the conventional model, covariates which were statistically significantly correlated 
with those components were sequentially removed until a set of uncorrelated 
covariates was produced. This resulted in the following set of six covariates: 
1. A market-wide covariate: 
a. Default Spread; and 
2. Five firm-specific covariates: 
a. EBITD/Total Assets42; 
                                                 
41
 At the 5% level of significance (see Appendix C), the model consisted of loge(Market Value) as well 
as one earnings or profitability measure. Term Spread was the only significant market-wide covariate, 
and only featured in two sub-samples in the latter part of the sample period. 
42
 EBITD/Total Assets was initially chosen in lieu of Net Profit/Total Assets for its connection with 
Wong et al. (2007). However, the results from estimating the six-variable model remained largely 
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b. EBIT/Interest Expenditure 
c. Current Assets/Current Liabilities; 
d. Market Value/Total Assets; and 
e. loge(Market Value). 
Table 10 and Table 11 outline the estimated coefficients of the six-variable 
conventional model and the six-variable time-dependent model, respectively. As 
expected, Default Spread, EBITD/Total Assets and loge(MV) featured prominently in 
the conventional six-variable model, with Current Assets/Current Liabilities only 
weakly significant in sub-periods up to 1996. Neither EBIT/Interest Expense nor 
Market Value/Total Assets made any appearances in the model. In the six-variable 
time-dependent proportional hazards model, the results were essentially the same 
though, again, some volatility in significance was exhibited by Default Spread, which 
disappeared from the model from 1997. 
For the purpose of creating a parsimonious and stable model, the covariate set was 
further reduced to a three-variable model of EBITD/Total Assets, loge(Market Value), 
and Default Spread. The final covariate was maintained, despite its volatility in the 
time-dependent model, for comparative purposes.  
With the multicollinearity issue appropriately addressed, it appeared, as Table 12 
attests, that much of the instability originally underlying the conventional model was 
removed. However, while the nature of the covariate set was relatively stable over 
time, the magnitudes of their impacts on the model remained volatile. In particular, 
the estimated coefficients to EBITD/Total Assets, and to a lesser extent loge(Market 
Value), significantly diminished in economic significance over time. In the time-
dependent proportional hazards model, Table 13 highlights a similar outcome. More 
disturbing, however, was that the model’s only remaining market-wide covariate 
entered the initial sub-samples as a weakly significant determinant of the hazard, only 
to eventually become redundant as observations were added. 
                                                                                                                                            
similar when Net Profit/Total Assets was applied in place of EBITD/Total Assets (see Appendix D and 
Appendix E). 
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Table 10: 
Model 1: Conventional proportional hazards (six-variable) model 
 
PRST 1984-1993 1984-1994 1984-1995 1984-1996 1984-1997 1984-1998 1984-1999
Default Spread -3.38 ** -1.71 ** -2.08 ** -1.87 ** -2.15 ** -2.06 ** -1.56 ** -1.08 **
(0.00) (0.03) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
EBITD/Total Assets -19.30 ** -4.76 ** -2.98 * -3.90 ** -3.82 ** -1.11 ** -1.12 ** -0.68 **
(0.00) (0.01) (0.09) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.02)
EBIT/Interest Expenditure 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
(0.51) (0.68) (0.92) (0.81) (0.99) (0.84) (0.98) (1.00)
CA/CL -1.04 ** -0.68 * -0.63 * -0.49 -0.49 * -0.08 -0.10 -0.09
(0.04) (0.09) (0.10) (0.18) (0.08) (0.31) (0.28) (0.30)
MV/Total Assets -0.26 -0.03 -0.10 0.00 -0.06 0.07 -0.06 0.10
(0.56) (0.94) (0.80) (0.99) (0.85) (0.83) (0.86) (0.74)
ln(MV) -0.75 * -0.63 ** -0.49 ** -0.56 ** -0.51 ** -0.48 ** -0.39 ** -0.34 **
(0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Observations 59 69 74 76 82 93 109 125
(59) (69) (74) (76) (81) (92) (107) (123)
 
** significant at 5%, * significant at 10%. 
Coefficient estimates (with p-values in parentheses) for the covariates in the six-variable model. PRST represents the sample of 59 firms examined by Partington et al. (2001) 
spanning the period 1984-1993. Data was added to the sample on a yearly basis. The remaining columns are labelled according to the period covered by the sample. The 
number of observations in each sample is noted (with the number of observations with complete data in parentheses). Default Spread is the Moody’s BAA Corporate Bond 
Rate less the Treasury Bond Rate; EBITD/Total Assets is the firm’s earnings before interest, tax and depreciation divided by its total assets; EBIT/Interest Expense is the 
firm’s earnings before interest and tax divided by its interest expense; CA/CL is the ratio of the firm’s current assets to its current liabilities; MV/Total Assets is the ratio of 
the firm’s market capitalisation to its total assets; ln(MV) is the natural log of the firm’s market capitalisation. All covariates were measured prior to the firm’s entry into 
Chapter 11. 
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Table 11: 
Model 2: Time-dependent proportional hazards (six-variable) model 
 
PRST 1984-1993 1984-1994 1984-1995 1984-1996 1984-1997 1984-1998 1984-1999
Default Spread -3.15 ** -1.72 * -1.97 ** -1.46 * -1.48 * -0.45 -0.14 0.21
(0.02) (0.09) (0.05) (0.10) (0.07) (0.42) (0.72) (0.50)
EBITD/Total Assets -15.23 ** -5.67 ** -3.98 ** -4.17 ** -4.06 ** -1.32 ** -1.33 ** -0.56 **
(0.00) (0.00) (0.02) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.04)
EBIT/Interest Expenditure 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
(0.90) (0.57) (0.76) (0.70) (0.87) (0.71) (0.82) (0.77)
CA/CL -1.38 ** -0.83 ** -0.76 ** -0.59 * -0.55 * -0.05 -0.07 -0.06
(0.02) (0.04) (0.05) (0.10) (0.06) (0.56) (0.45) (0.48)
MV/Total Assets -0.11 0.06 0.03 0.10 0.06 0.25 0.09 0.22
(0.80) (0.88) (0.94) (0.78) (0.86) (0.48) (0.81) (0.48)
ln(MV) -0.69 ** -0.63 ** -0.50 ** -0.53 ** -0.47 ** -0.48 ** -0.39 ** -0.34 **
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Observations 59 69 74 76 82 93 109 125
(59) (69) (74) (76) (81) (92) (107) (123)
 
 
** significant at 5%, * significant at 10%. 
Coefficient estimates (with p-values in parentheses) for the covariates in the six-variable model. PRST represents the sample of 59 firms examined by Partington et al. (2001) 
spanning the period 1984-1993. Data was added to the sample on a yearly basis. The remaining columns are labelled according to the period covered by the sample. The 
number of observations in each sample is noted (with the number of observations with complete data in parentheses). Default Spread is the Moody’s BAA Corporate Bond 
Rate less the Treasury Bond Rate; EBITD/Total Assets is the firm’s earnings before interest, tax and depreciation divided by its total assets; EBIT/Interest Expense is the 
firm’s earnings before interest and tax divided by its interest expense; CA/CL is the ratio of the firm’s current assets to its current liabilities; MV/Total Assets is the ratio of 
the firm’s market capitalisation to its total assets; ln(MV) is the natural log of the firm’s market capitalisation. Default Spread was measured monthly for the duration of the 
firm’s Chapter 11 proceedings; all other covariates were measured prior to the firm’s entry into Chapter 11. 
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Table 12: 
Model 1: Conventional proportional hazards (three-variable) model 
 
 
PRST 1984-1993 1984-1994 1984-1995 1984-1996 1984-1997 1984-1998 1984-1999
Default Spread -3.31 ** -1.96 ** -2.28 ** -2.06 ** -2.22 ** -2.00 ** -1.44 ** -1.02 **
(0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
EBITD/Total Assets -19.07 ** -4.51 ** -2.96 * -3.80 ** -3.00 ** -1.14 ** -1.21 ** -0.76 **
(0.00) (0.01) (0.09) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01)
ln(MV) -0.87 ** -0.69 ** -0.58 ** -0.62 ** -0.56 ** -0.45 ** -0.39 ** -0.34 **
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Observations 59 69 74 76 82 93 109 125
(59) (69) (74) (76) (82) (93) (109) (125)
 
 
 
Table 13: 
Model 2: Time-dependent proportional hazards (three-variable) model 
 
PRST 1984-1993 1984-1994 1984-1995 1984-1996 1984-1997 1984-1998 1984-1999
Default Spread -2.19 * -1.43 -1.72 * -1.33 -1.22 -0.48 -0.15 0.21
(0.08) (0.15) (0.07) (0.12) (0.12) (0.38) (0.68) (0.49)
EBITD/Total Assets -14.36 ** -5.36 ** -3.89 ** -4.08 ** -3.28 ** -1.33 ** -1.32 ** -0.63 **
(0.00) (0.00) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01)
ln(MV) -0.71 ** -0.66 ** -0.55 ** -0.56 ** -0.50 ** -0.46 ** -0.37 ** -0.33 **
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Observations 59 69 74 76 82 93 109 125
(59) (69) (74) (76) (82) (93) (109) (125)
 
 
** significant at 5%, * significant at 10%. 
Coefficient estimates (with p-values in parentheses) for the covariates in the three-variable model. PRST represents the sample of 59 firms examined by Partington et al. 
(2001) spanning the period 1984-1993. Data was added to the sample on a yearly basis. The remaining columns are labelled according to the period covered by the sample. 
The number of observations in each sample is noted (with the number of observations with complete data in parentheses). Default Spread is the Moody’s BAA Corporate 
Bond Rate less the Treasury Bond Rate; EBITD/Total Assets is the firm’s earnings before interest, tax and depreciation divided by its total assets; ln(MV) is the natural log of 
the firm’s market capitalisation. Default Spread in the time-dependent proportional hazards model (Model 2) was measured monthly for the duration of the firm’s Chapter 11 
proceedings; all other covariates were measured prior to the firm’s entry into Chapter 11. 
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5.3. What went wrong this time? 
 
Considering the relative stability of its conventional counterpart, there were 
essentially two potential reasons for the phenomenon experienced by the time-
dependent model. First, it was possible that by only accounting for the time-dependent 
nature of the economic climate, a new source of heterogeneity was created when the 
equally significant changes in the structure and performance of a firm throughout its 
life in Chapter 11 were ignored. In Denis and Rogers (2007), 297 first-time 
bankruptcy filings were considered for the period 1985-1994 with a number of firm 
and industry characteristics found to affect the outcome of Chapter 11 proceedings. Of 
particular interest to the present scenario, it was also found that changes in those 
characteristics during the life of Chapter 11 would also affect this outcome. This led 
the study to conclude that the ability of a firm to restructure operationally and 
financially would increase the likelihood of its emergence as an independent 
reorganised firm.  
The second potential reason for the observed result would be quite simply that during 
the period examined, the economic climate (or more specifically the factor presently 
under examination) was insignificant in predicting the outcome of Chapter 11 
proceedings. Thus, as the argument would go, by controlling for the variation in 
economic climate throughout a firm’s duration in Chapter 11 (through the use of time-
varying market-wide covariates), and by removing the influences of correlated 
covariates on the remaining market-wide covariate, the insignificance of economic 
climate in this predictive model was brought to the fore. While such a contention may 
seem contrary to expectations, this would not be the first study to make such a finding 
(for example, Bandopadhyaya, 1994 found GNP growth and prime interest rate to be 
insignificant determinants of the hazard of emergence from Chapter 11).  
A proper investigation of this issue would require some level of consistency between 
treatment of the market-wide covariate and that of the firm-specific covariates. That 
is, one could estimate a time-dependent proportional hazards model which applied 
time-dependent firm-specific covariates as well as a time-dependent market-wide 
covariate, or alternatively, one could estimate a conventional proportional hazards 
model. Thus, a dilemma arose. While the former approach was impractical by reason 
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of data restrictions, the latter meant returning to the original scenario, spelling the end 
for the present study. 
With two unappealing approaches and an inability to satisfactorily resolve the issue, a 
third path was created to subvert the impact of market-wide influences. 
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6. Deconstructing Cox’s Proportional Hazards Model: A different 
approach to survival analysis through calendar-time modelling 
 
6.1. The theory behind calendar-time modelling 
 
As Section 3.1.2 pointed out, survival analysis models have traditionally been 
estimated on an ‘event time’ basis. In an affront to this traditional approach, a 
calendar-time-based estimation process was proposed, motivated by a desire to 
abstract the model from the effects of market-wide covariates. This estimation 
approach was inspired by medical uses of survival analysis (for example, Korn et al., 
1997). 
 
6.1.1. The road to a calendar-time survival analysis model 
 
In medical research, when studying deaths caused by the onset of some disease of 
interest, it is common to apply the time of diagnosis as marking entry into the risk set. 
However, as Allison (1995) noted, there may be wide variations in time between the 
onset and diagnosis of disease, introducing substantial noise into the lengths of failure 
times. Further, if there was some systematic difference in diagnostic times (for 
example, by reason of age or social class), this may lead to biases in the model. In a 
medical application of Cox’s proportional hazards model, Korn et al. (1997) found 
that it may be preferable to use a patient’s date of birth as marking the time of entry 
into a risk set as the hazard was expected to change more as a function of a patient’s 
age than as a function of the duration from diagnosis til death. As Allison (1995) 
demonstrated, it was then also possible to ‘left-truncate’ the data to account for late 
entry into the risk set (since, by construction, those individuals who became part of a 
study could not have died between their date of birth and their time of entry into that 
study). 
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It is not the contention of the present study that there was any fault in the use of the 
Chapter 11 filing date as the time of origin. Indeed, the question in this whole line of 
literature has been how Chapter 11 proceedings are resolved once entered into. 
However, the lesson which can be learnt from Korn et al. (1997) is that by ordering 
the data in different ways, it is possible for the undefined underlying hazard to vary as 
a function of the different effects of time. In the present context, two effects of time 
have been identified. First, as Bandopadhyaya (1994) and Li (1999) found, a firm’s 
hazard of emergence from Chapter 11 is dependent on its duration in those 
proceedings (the “duration effect”). Second, as Wong et al. (2007) demonstrated, there 
was some change in the Chapter 11 environment throughout the period examined (the 
“calendar effect”). 
Analogously to the use of age in Korn et al. (1997), by arranging observations 
according to when they failed on the calendar43, the underlying hazard would be 
allowed to vary as a function of that calendar-time, thus capturing the ‘calendar 
effect’. What of the ‘duration effect’? Through this arrangement of failures, it was no 
longer possible to explicitly identify the duration effect, which would have required 
failures to be ordered according to event time (as was previously done). However, this 
study had never been motivated by the desire to explicitly model the ‘duration effect’ 
and indeed, the use Cox’s proportional hazards model was proposed by Partington et 
al. (2001) to dispense with this very task. Nevertheless, this effect still needed to be 
controlled for. To this end, it was possible to truncate the observations on the left 
(according to the suggestion by Allison, 1995) such that firms only entered the risk set 
on the date they filed for Chapter 1144. In this manner, the duration spent by each firm 
in a risk set reflected their duration under Chapter 11 protection. Thus, as the 
experience of Korn et al. (1997) and Allison (1995) suggested, when observations 
were arranged according to their calendar-time failures, and also truncated on the left 
to their date of entry into Chapter 11, both the ‘duration effect’ and the ‘calendar 
                                                 
43
 That is, with reference to some common baseline date, for example, 1 January 1900. 
44
 Essentially, the covariates of a left-truncated firm were assigned missing values until that firm 
entered the risk set. Thus, until that time, the firm was removed from any likelihood calculations. 
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effect’ could be subsumed into the underlying hazard function45. Figure 3 outlines the 
process by which this arrangement of observations was achieved. 
 
Figure 3: 
Constructing a calendar time model 
 
Data: Observations A-E as they enter and exit the risk set in calendar time. 
 
 
 
Step 1: Changing the origin of entry into the risk set. Observations A-E arranged by event time with all 
observations treated as having entered the risk set at calendar-time zero. 
 
 
                                                 
45
 This was one means of controlling for the effects without the need to recognise their precise nature. 
In this manner, both effects became confounded into the unspecified underlying hazard function. 
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Step 2: Observations A-E truncated on the left to their respective (calendar-time) dates of entry into the 
study.  
 
 
6.1.2. What about the market-wide covariates? 
Recall that the calendar-time model was introduced with one simple aim: to abstract 
the analysis of covariates from the confounding effects of market-wide factors. How 
does it do so? Recall Equation (3.4) and consider the likelihood function for the 
failure of Firm i:  
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In the likelihood function, the sum in the denominator was taken over all firms (j’s) in 
the risk set at Firm i’s failure time, Ti. If one were to decompose the vector of 
covariates, z(Ti), into its time-constant and time-dependent components, such that z1 
represented the vector of time-constant covariates and β1 the vector of their 
coefficients, while z2(Ti) and β2 represented the vector of the time-dependent 
covariates at failure time Ti and the vector of their coefficients, respectively, then: 
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Consequently, the likelihood function would become: 
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Significantly, as Figure 4 illustrates, time-dependent covariates in a calendar-time 
model are measured from the same point on the calendar.  
 
Figure 4: 
Calculation of likelihoods in a calendar time model 
 
Calculation of the likelihood for the failure of Individual A in a calendar-time model in the presence of 
time-dependent covariates: 
 
 
 
However, in the present study, the time-dependent covariates were macroeconomic 
variables. Thus, in a calendar-time model, values of the time-dependent (market-wide) 
covariates should be equal for all firms in the risk set at every failure time. That is: 
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Therefore, following from Equation (6.2), the impact of the time-dependent market-
wide covariates become eliminated from the likelihood function46, such that: 
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6.2. Model 3: Calendar-time model 
 
A baseline date of 1 January 198447 was applied as the origin point by which to 
arrange failures. The data was then truncated on the left to each firm’s date of filing 
for Chapter 11. The function being estimated can be expressed as: 
 
 
( ' ( ))
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Notice that this is expressed in the same way as the function estimated by Model 2 
(the time-dependent proportional hazards model), as set out in Equation (3.7). The 
reason for this is that a ‘calendar-time model’ is not so much an alternative ‘model’ as 
                                                 
46
 Indeed, this method would eliminate the influence of all time-dependent covariates which apply 
uniformly to all firms in the market, thus abstracting the estimation of this model from systematic 
market-wide influences. 
47
 Since the partial likelihood method is concerned only with the ordering of events (that is, their 
ordinal rather than absolute times) (see Section 3.1.2), the model is insensitive to the choice of baseline 
date. Indeed, when different baseline dates were applied in estimating the models, the results remained 
unaltered. 
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it is a different means of constructing risk sets. There were two fundamental 
differences in the estimation of Model 2 and Model 3. In the latter, t represented the 
time to failure on a calendar-time scale, while in order to give effect to left truncation 
of the data, values of z(t) are deemed to be missing between the time of origin and the 
(calendar-time) date of filing, removing them from likelihood calculations. 
The firm-specific covariates were, again, measured prior to entry into Chapter 11 and 
were constant over time48 while the market-wide covariates were allowed to vary with 
time49. 
 
6.3. Results 
 
Table 14 and Table 15 outline the results yielded by the calendar-time approach in 
estimating the six-variable and the three-variable models, respectively50. With 
multicollinearity controlled for, the results were as expected. Default Spread was 
driven to insignificance while EBITD/Total Assets and loge(Market Value) were, on 
the whole, significant throughout the sample period51. 
The magnitudes of the significant covariates were dampened in this model compared 
with the event-time models, though this was not a cause for concern. The nature of the 
calendar-time model was that it was not (and indeed by virtue of its construction of 
risk sets, could no longer be) a predictive model52. Rather, it was an analytical tool 
                                                 
48
 Technically, however, the firm-specific covariates were treated by the model as being time-dependent 
covariates with missing values up until their date of entry into Chapter 11, after which the covariate 
values became time-constant. 
49
 Here, it was assumed that the monthly interest rate data was collected on the first day of each 
(calendar) month. 
50
 The calendar-time model was also estimated for the entire set of eleven covariates. The results from 
that model (Appendix F) were highly insignificant and highlighted the necessity, particularly for this 
method it would appear, of controlling for multicollinearity. 
51
 An estimation of the six-variable model using Net Profit/Total Assets as the earnings covariate (see 
Appendix G) produced largely similar results. 
52
 By being estimated in abstraction from the systematic effects of time, the coefficient values also lost 
their predictive value. 
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used to consider the impacts of firm-specific covariates in isolation from the effects of 
time. As an analytical tool, what was of interest was that the pattern of instability 
apparent in the event-time models seemed to remain in these results (particularly in 
the EBITD/Total Assets covariate). 
Thus, even after controlling for the confounding effects of market-wide covariates and 
the effects of calendar-time (in addition to duration), it was apparent that some of the 
instability underlying the model remained elusive. Was there in fact a systematic 
‘calendar effect’ that needed to be controlled for? In the hunt for answers, it was 
proposed that a Date-of-Filing indicator should be incorporated into the calendar-time 
model. As previously noted, the underlying hazard function in a calendar-time model 
should capture both the duration and the calendar effects of time before the impacts of 
the covariates on the hazard are estimated. The proposed indicator was added in an 
effort to extract a linear representation of the latter effect from the underlying hazard 
function, though it became apparent that this was not all that was extracted. 
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Table 14: 
Model 3: Calendar-time (six-variable) model 
 
PRST 1984-1993 1984-1994 1984-1995 1984-1996 1984-1997 1984-1998 1984-1999
Default Spread -6.11 -7.92 -7.42 -7.41 -4.58 -6.84 -1.52 -0.16
(0.48) (0.30) (0.34) (0.33) (0.48) (0.13) (0.65) (0.96)
EBITD/Total Assets -10.72 ** -4.84 ** -4.88 ** -4.41 ** -3.42 ** -1.31 ** -0.92 * -0.36
(0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.03) (0.02) (0.08) (0.27)
EBIT/Interest Expenditure 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
(0.93) (0.62) (0.53) (0.56) (0.58) (0.49) (0.60) (0.59)
CA/CL -0.71 * -0.30 -0.30 -0.27 -0.30 -0.09 -0.08 -0.09
(0.10) (0.38) (0.37) (0.42) (0.16) (0.28) (0.37) (0.33)
MV/Total Assets -0.65 -0.13 -0.09 -0.04 -0.05 0.02 -0.26 -0.05
(0.24) (0.76) (0.83) (0.91) (0.89) (0.96) (0.53) (0.87)
ln(MV) -0.46 ** -0.40 ** -0.49 ** -0.44 ** -0.37 ** -0.37 ** -0.24 ** -0.20 **
(0.05) (0.04) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.03) (0.05)
Observations 59 69 74 76 82 93 109 125
(59) (69) (74) (76) (81) (92) (107) (123)
 
 
Table 15:  
Model 3: Calendar-time (three-variable) model 
 
PRST 1984-1993 1984-1994 1984-1995 1984-1996 1984-1997 1984-1998 1984-1999
Default Spread -9.89 -8.69 -8.28 -8.14 -4.91 -7.18 -1.44 -0.03
(0.25) (0.26) (0.28) (0.29) (0.44) (0.11) (0.66) (0.99)
EBITD/Total Assets -10.82 ** -4.87 ** -4.91 ** -4.43 ** -2.98 * -1.39 ** -0.88 * -0.39
(0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.06) (0.01) (0.06) (0.20)
ln(MV) -0.54 ** -0.45 ** -0.53 ** -0.48 ** -0.42 ** -0.34 ** -0.22 ** -0.19 *
(0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.04) (0.07)
Observations 59 69 74 76 82 93 109 125
(59) (69) (74) (76) (82) (93) (109) (125)
 
 
** significant at 5%, * significant at 10%. 
Coefficient estimates (with p-values in parentheses) for the covariates in the six-variable and three-variable models. PRST represents the sample of 59 firms examined by 
Partington et al. (2001) spanning the period 1984-1993. Data was added to the sample on a yearly basis. The remaining columns are labelled according to the period covered 
by the sample. The number of observations in each sample is noted (with the number of observations with complete data in parentheses). Default Spread is the Moody’s BAA 
Corporate Bond Rate less the Treasury Bond Rate; EBITD/Total Assets is the firm’s earnings before interest, tax and depreciation divided by its total assets; ln(MV) is the 
natural log of the firm’s market capitalisation. Default Spread was measured monthly for the duration of the firm’s Chapter 11 proceedings; all other covariates were 
measured prior to the firm’s entry into Chapter 11. 
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7. Reconstruction: Identifying the ‘calendar effect’ 
 
7.1. Background 
 
A number of studies in the past have proffered that a firm’s date of entry into Chapter 
11 should have a significant impact on the expected outcome of those proceedings. 
The theories which have been espoused to support this have been varied but can be 
roughly divided into two categories. The first presented a macroeconomic perspective, 
citing recessionary periods as having an impact on firm distress and bankruptcy 
outcome (the “recession argument”). The second category of studies identified a 
change in the Chapter 11 environment not directly related to economic climate (the 
“changing environment argument”). 
 
7.1.1. The recession argument 
Richardson et al. (1998) considered an accounting-based logistic regression model 
used to predict the onset of financial distress and examined the model’s sensitivity to: 
1. Entry by firms into bankruptcy during a recessionary period; and 
2. The use of accounting data from a recessionary period. 
It was found that when these factors were accounted for, the predictive power of a 
model was incrementally improved over that of an uncontrolled model, noting that 
“the impact of a recession on the risk of corporate failure should vary as a function of 
firms’ fundamental characteristics” (Richardson et al., 1998: 169). That is, some firms 
were better able to protect themselves from recessionary impacts. Thus, for those 
firm-specific covariates in the present model which proxy for characteristics crucial to 
a firm’s survival during a recession, their effects on the hazard may alter in such 
periods. This potentially non-systematic operation of a subset of covariates may not 
be captured by the underlying hazard function of a calendar-time model (or indeed by 
market-wide covariates in an event-time model). 
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In Richardson et al. (1998), a recession was defined to be the period beginning after a 
peak in the economic cycle and ending at the month of the trough. The peak and 
trough times were determined by the National Bureau of Economic Research and 
were as follows53:  
Peak   Trough 
1980 January  1980 July 
1981 July  1982 November 
1990 July  1991 March 
2001 March  2001 November 
In the context of bankruptcy resolution prediction, this was applied in Bryan et al. 
(2002), which used a logit model to predict emergence (as an independent entity or 
through being acquired) or liquidation from bankruptcy. The study included in its 
model an indicator variable for firms which filed for bankruptcy during a recession 
period as identified above. This variable was found to have a significant and negative 
impact on a firm’s probability of emergence from Chapter 11. 
 
7.1.2. The ‘changing environment’ argument 
Other studies have used similar indicators for date of entry with different explanations 
for their predictive power. For example, Li (1999) applied a post-1990 indicator 
variable, and found that firms filing for Chapter 11 after 1990 spent less time in 
Chapter 11 before emerging. It was contended that this was a result of a changing 
bankruptcy environment in the 1990s with bankruptcy judges and professionals 
gaining experience and improving their efficiency54. 
                                                 
53
 National Bureau of Economic Research, http://www.nber.org/cycles.html. 
54
 Neither Recession nor Post-1990 indicators were found to be statistically significant when 
individually added to a conventional event-time model (see Appendix H and Appendix I). Similar 
findings were made with respect to a calendar-time model. 
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Orbe et al. (2002), another survival analysis study, considered original issuers of high 
yield bonds entering Chapter 11 bankruptcy from 1982 to 1991, and followed those 
filings until 1994. The duration model used by Orbe et al. (2002) was a censored 
partial regression model which, it was contended, was highly flexible as it did not 
require any distributional assumptions about the hazard and, unlike Cox’s proportional 
hazards model, did not assume the proportionality of hazards. Orbe et al. (2002) 
ventured that there were various changes in the Chapter 11 environment during their 
period of study, notably: 
1. That the significance of Li’s (1999) post-1990 dummy variable could be 
explained by changes in US tax laws whereby a firm reducing its debt outside 
Chapter 11 was required to pay taxes over the reduced debt; 
2. The increased participation of ‘vulture funds’ in the restructuring process as a 
threat of managerial discipline, thus reducing the time spent in Chapter 11 
(this was first noted by Hotchkiss and Mooradian, 1997); and 
3. That the frequency of defaults was changing through time. 
Using a non-parametric time trend (essentially a filing date indicator) to capture the 
above effects, it was found that firms entering Chapter 11 exhibited a shorter duration 
through time. 
 
7.2. Model 4: Calendar-time model with Date-of-Filing indicator 
 
In the spirit of Orbe et al. (2002), a Date-of-Filing indicator was added to the 
calendar-time model (Model 3). The indicator was based on a time of origin of 1 
January 198455. One of the motivating factors behind undertaking this initiative within 
the framework of a calendar-time model was such that the potential collinearity 
effects of this indicator with market-wide covariates could be avoided. As will be 
                                                 
55
 Again, the results were insensitive to the choice of origin. 
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apparent, however, this was also to create some problems when the results were 
analysed. 
 
7.3. Results: More than meets the eye? 
 
As Table 16 attests, the Date-of-Filing indicator was consistently significant 
throughout the sample period while the remainder of the results were generally 
unchanged from those of Model 3. Indeed, EBITD/Total Assets enjoyed a slight 
improvement in significance in the final two sub-periods while the magnitudes of the 
coefficients on EBITD/Total Assets and loge(Market Value) were both larger in 
absolute values. 
The Date-of-Filing itself had a negative impact on the hazard56. However, whether 
this could be attributed solely to the ‘calendar effect’ as expressed by Orbe et al. 
(2002) among others was another issue. Allison (1995) identified that when a date-of-
entry indicator was added to a model such as this57, at each failure time, that indicator 
was, for each individual in the risk set, an exact linear function of their duration in the 
study58. That is, an individual who entered a study at a later point in time would have 
experienced a shorter duration in that study when a failure occurred (and when the 
likelihood function was computed). Thus, Allison (1995) essentially argued, this 
covariate in fact brought forth the ‘duration effect’ from the underlying hazard 
function. 
In an attempt to separate the two effects, the Date-of-Filing indicator was added to the 
conventional and the time-dependent event-time models (Models 1 and 2, 
respectively). In those models, the Date-of-Filing indicator should have no correlation 
with duration and should therefore only capture the ‘calendar effect’. 
                                                 
56
 While the magnitude of the Date-of-Filing indicator does not appear economically significant, that 
this represented a daily effect on the hazard should be kept in mind. 
57
 The context of Allison’s (1995) comment was an age-time-scale model with left truncation to the 
date of entry into a study. 
58
 Since duration can be given by the failure time (in calendar-time) less the date of entry into the study. 
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Table 16: 
Model 4: Calendar-time model with Date-of-Filing indicator 
 
PRST 1984-1993 1984-1994 1984-1995 1984-1996 1984-1997 1984-1998 1984-1999
Default Spread -10.96 -8.05 -7.93 -7.82 -3.03 -3.72 -0.13 0.76
(0.24) (0.32) (0.33) (0.33) (0.65) (0.42) (0.97) (0.78)
EBITD/Total Assets -12.32 ** -5.01 ** -5.16 ** -4.84 ** -3.41 ** -1.62 ** -1.19 ** -0.51 *
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.03) (0.00) (0.01) (0.08)
ln(MV) -0.70 ** -0.65 ** -0.71 ** -0.68 ** -0.58 ** -0.48 ** -0.36 ** -0.28 **
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01)
Date-of-Filing -0.0024 ** -0.0023 ** -0.0023 ** -0.0024 ** -0.0021 ** -0.0018 ** -0.0019 ** -0.0016 **
(0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Observations 59 69 74 76 82 93 109 125
 
 
** significant at 5%, * significant at 10%. 
Coefficient estimates (with p-values in parentheses) for the covariates in the three-variable model with a Date-of-Filing indicator. PRST represents the sample of 59 firms 
examined by Partington et al. (2001) spanning the period 1984-1993. Data was added to the sample on a yearly basis. The remaining columns are labelled according to the 
period covered by the sample. The number of observations in each sample is noted. Default Spread is the Moody’s BAA Corporate Bond Rate less the Treasury Bond Rate; 
EBITD/Total Assets is the firm’s earnings before interest, tax and depreciation divided by its total assets; ln(MV) is the natural log of the firm’s market capitalisation; Date-
of-Filing is the number of days between the firm’s Chapter 11 filing date and 1 January 1984. Default Spread was measured monthly for the duration of the firm’s Chapter 11 
proceedings; all other covariates were measured prior to the firm’s entry into Chapter 11. 
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Table 17: 
Conventional model with Date-of-Filing indicator 
 
PRST 1984-1993 1984-1994 1984-1995 1984-1996 1984-1997 1984-1998 1984-1999
Default Spread -2.37 ** -1.49 -1.54 -1.43 -1.58 * -1.85 ** -1.07 ** -0.67 **
(0.05) (0.13) (0.11) (0.13) (0.06) (0.02) (0.02) (0.05)
EBITD/Total Assets -10.07 ** -3.09 * -2.21 -3.09 ** -2.36 * -0.95 ** -0.90 ** -0.42
(0.00) (0.06) (0.16) (0.04) (0.06) (0.03) (0.02) (0.14)
ln(MV) -0.49 ** -0.49 ** -0.44 ** -0.49 ** -0.47 ** -0.40 ** -0.32 ** -0.26 **
(0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Date-of-Filing 0.0000 0.0002 0.0002 0.0002 0.0001 0.0000 0.0001 0.0003 **
(0.95) (0.71) (0.55) (0.67) (0.64) (0.81) (0.30) (0.01)
Observations 59 69 74 76 82 93 109 125
 
 
Table 18: 
Time-dependent model with Date-of-Filing indicator 
 
PRST 1984-1993 1984-1994 1984-1995 1984-1996 1984-1997 1984-1998 1984-1999
Default Spread 0.19 0.18 0.47 0.25 0.27 -0.31 -0.52 -0.31
(0.92) (0.91) (0.74) (0.82) (0.78) (0.56) (0.20) (0.39)
EBITD/Total Assets -16.59 ** -5.43 ** -4.16 ** -5.02 ** -3.25 ** -0.95 ** -0.88 ** -0.37
(0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.03) (0.02) (0.18)
ln(MV) -0.74 ** -0.65 ** -0.56 ** -0.61 ** -0.54 ** -0.44 ** -0.30 ** -0.25 **
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01)
Date-of-Filing 0.0011 * 0.0007 0.0010 ** 0.0008 ** 0.0006 ** 0.0004 ** 0.0004 ** 0.0004 **
(0.09) (0.19) (0.05) (0.02) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Observations 59 69 74 76 82 93 109 125
 
 
** significant at 5%, * significant at 10%. 
Coefficient estimates (with p-values in parentheses) for the covariates in the three-variable model with a Date-of-Filing indicator. PRST represents the sample of 59 firms 
examined by Partington et al. (2001) spanning the period 1984-1993. Data was added to the sample on a yearly basis. The remaining columns are labelled according to the 
period covered by the sample. The number of observations in each sample is noted. Default Spread is the Moody’s BAA Corporate Bond Rate less the Treasury Bond Rate; 
EBITD/Total Assets is the firm’s earnings before interest, tax and depreciation divided by its total assets; ln(MV) is the natural log of the firm’s market capitalisation; Date-
of-Filing is the number of days between the firm’s Chapter 11 filing date and 1 January 1984. Default Spread in the time-dependent model was measured monthly for the 
duration of the firm’s Chapter 11 proceedings; all other covariates were measured prior to the firm’s entry into Chapter 11. 
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The results from this inquiry, set out in Table 17 and Table 18, suggested that the 
‘calendar effect’ should be (though not consistently statistically significantly so) 
positive. Under the assumption that the Date-of-Filing indicator in the calendar-time 
model captured both the ‘calendar effect’ and the ‘duration effect’, this result would 
leave the Date-of-Filing indicator with a negative coefficient vis-à-vis the latter. Put 
together, these results led to two tentative conclusions. Firstly, the direction of the 
‘calendar effect’ reflected an overall increase in the hazard throughout the period 1984 
to 199959. What did a negative coefficient on Date-of-Filing mean for the ‘duration 
effect’? Since a later Date-of-Filing (relative to a failure time) represented a shorter 
duration spent in Chapter 11, the negative coefficient on the Date-of-Filing indicator 
implied that the shorter the duration of proceedings, the lower the hazard. 
Alternatively put, this positive ‘duration effect’ suggested that as a firm’s life in 
Chapter 11 proceedings increased, the expected outcome for existing shareholders 
tended towards a return of zero. Though the results, particularly in respect of the 
‘duration effect’ would appear intuitive, the findings are difficult to compare with 
those of the extant literature due to differences in the events examined60.  
There are strong caveats regarding the interpretation of these admittedly tentative 
assertions. The impacts of the Date-of-Filing indicators in the conventional and time-
dependent models were by no means definitive. In the case of the former model, by 
reason of the coefficient’s lack of significance, and in the case of the latter, by reason 
of that model’s recognised instability. Further, as previously warned, there were 
potential correlation effects between Date-of-Filing and the market-wide covariate 
(Default Spread). In fact, as the correlation matrix in Table 19 demonstrates, this 
extended to all of the covariates in a three-variable model61, 62. 
                                                 
59
 This assertion was consistent with an observed increased percentage in event occurrences in the final 
years of the sample period. Appendix J illustrates this with respect to Model 4, with any deviations 
from this pattern a result of missing covariate values in models.  
60
 For example, Li (1999) and Bandopadhyaya (1994) (on the ‘duration effect’) and Orbe et al. (2002) 
(on the ‘calendar effect’) all examined emergence (as distinguished from liquidation) as their event of 
interest, rather than value outcomes. 
61
 The negative correlation with EBITD/Total Assets and loge(Market Value) perhaps sheds some light 
on their growths in economic and statistical significance when the Date-of-Filing indicator was added 
to the calendar-time model.  
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Table 19: 
Correlation Matrix: Date-of-Filing indicator 
 
Date-of-Filing Default Spread EBITD/Total Assets ln(MV)
Date-of-Filing 1 -0.19 ** -0.30 ** -0.18 **
(0.04) (0.00) (0.05)
Default Spread -0.19 ** 1 -0.02 0.02
(0.04) (0.81) (0.79)
EBITD/Total Assets -0.30 ** -0.02 1 -0.02
(0.00) (0.81) (0.81)
ln(MV) -0.18 ** 0.02 -0.02 1
(0.05) (0.79) (0.81)
 
 
** significant at 5%, * significant at 10%. 
Correlation coefficient (with p-values in parentheses) between Date-of-Filing and the covariates in the 
three-variable model. Date-of-Filing is the number of days between the firm’s Chapter 11 filing date 
and 1 January 1984; Default Spread is the Moody’s BAA Corporate Bond Rate less the Treasury Bond 
Rate; EBITD/Total Assets is the firm’s earnings before interest, tax and depreciation divided by its total 
assets; ln(MV) is the natural log of the firm’s market capitalisation. All covariates were measured prior 
to the firm’s entry into Chapter 11. 
 
 
Despite its flaws, the finding of a positive ‘calendar effect’ provided some useful 
insights into the sample examined. A number of environmental factors (economic or 
otherwise) have previously been proffered as to why the expected outcome of Chapter 
11 proceedings should change as a function of calendar-time63, though it would be 
arbitrary to select a sub-set of these to explain the observed phenomenon. 
Nevertheless, the question remained: What was driving the instability in the models? 
With the systematic effects of time controlled for, it was not implausible for there to 
also have been non-systematic (specifically firm-level) factors in play throughout the 
sample period. 
                                                                                                                                            
62
 The Date-of-Filing indicator was regressed against Default Spread, EBITD/Total Assets and 
loge(Market Value). All three covariates were significantly related to Date-of-Filing (as expected). 
However, a plot of the residuals from the regression against Date-of-Filing demonstrated a positive 
relationship, suggesting that the Date-of-Filing indicator was not merely a proxy for the already-
specified covariates (see Appendix K). 
63
  See Section 7.1. 
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8. An inquiry into the non-systematic drivers of model instability 
 
8.1. The changing face of bankruptcy filing firms: Revisiting the descriptive 
statistics 
 
The discourse in the area of bankruptcy resolution has described a change in the 
nature of firms under Chapter 11 protection. Rose-Green and Dawkins (2002) 
identified those firms who filed ‘strategic bankruptcies’ and found that they were less 
likely to lose out in bankruptcy proceedings. Did the incidence of such bankruptcies 
change throughout the period examined? Hotchkiss and Mooradian (1997) drew 
attention to the entry of ‘vulture funds’ into the Chapter 11 process, and noted their 
disciplinary role in the restructure of distressed firms. Are there characteristics which 
are systematic of those firms which were restructured by vulture funds before they 
could file for bankruptcy, and conversely, of those firms left alone by these funds? 
While the phenomena of ‘strategic bankruptcies’ and ‘vulture funds’ could not be 
readily considered in the present study, it was possible to examine the descriptive 
statistics of the filing firms throughout the sample period to determine if there was 
any merit in the contention of a ‘changing face’ of bankruptcy filing firms. The results 
from this inquiry, as outlined in Table 20, showed that there was indeed a change over 
time in the characteristics of firms which filed for Chapter 11 protection. Notably, the 
last three years of the study saw a marked decline in mean EBITD/Total Assets while, 
throughout the study, the EBIT/Interest Expense and Current Assets/Current 
Liabilities covariates experienced heavy fluctuations (in means as well as standard 
deviations). Both were clues prompting further investigation into the changing nature 
of bankrupt firms64. In the case of the falling EBITD/Total Assets, the possibility was 
raised as to the entry of abnormally poor performers while, with respect to the 
fluctuating levels of interest coverage and liquidity covariates, the question was what 
this meant for the long-term (solvency) and short-term (liquidity) risks faced by firms 
in Chapter 11. 
                                                 
64
 Interestingly, the mean number of days spent in Chapter 11 proceedings also consistently fell in the 
final four years of the sample period. 
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Table 20: 
Descriptive statistics over sample period 
 
Mean 
PRST 1984-1993 1984-1994 1984-1995 1984-1996 1984-1997 1984-1998 1984-1999
Default Spread 1.71 1.70 1.68 1.67 1.64 1.60 1.62 1.68
Term Spread 2.61 2.58 2.61 2.57 2.47 2.35 2.11 1.96
Net Profit/Total Assets -0.08 -0.09 -0.09 -0.09 -0.10 -0.14 -0.18 -0.23
EBITD/Total Assets -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.02 -0.06 -0.08 -0.11
Total Assets/Total Liabilities 1.13 1.15 1.17 1.17 1.20 1.20 1.21 1.21
MV/Total Liabilities 0.13 0.14 0.15 0.15 0.18 0.18 0.19 0.21
EBIT/Interest Expenditure -2490.77 -2129.96 -1986.14 -1934.00 -1817.46 -1601.06 -1377.57 -1199.15
CA/CL 1.03 1.11 1.10 1.10 1.19 1.34 1.33 1.27
MV/Total Assets 0.14 0.14 0.14 0.14 0.15 0.15 0.16 0.17
ln(MV) 2.22 2.41 2.44 2.45 2.47 2.45 2.39 2.35
ln(Total Assets) 4.96 5.14 5.13 5.14 5.11 5.11 5.09 5.05
Number of days in Chapter 11 533.41 560.48 541.49 545.84 535.46 522.78 507.03 481.14
Observations 59 69 74 76 82 92 109 125
 
 
Standard Deviation 
PRST 1984-1993 1984-1994 1984-1995 1984-1996 1984-1997 1984-1998 1984-1999
Default Spread 0.37 0.37 0.37 0.37 0.37 0.37 0.37 0.38
Term Spread 1.25 1.22 1.18 1.19 1.20 1.18 1.24 1.23
Net Profit/Total Assets 0.15 0.15 0.15 0.15 0.16 0.28 0.32 0.46
EBITD/Total Assets 0.08 0.09 0.11 0.11 0.12 0.23 0.26 0.34
Total Assets/Total Liabilities 0.49 0.48 0.51 0.51 0.56 0.54 0.52 0.57
MV/Total Liabilities 0.19 0.23 0.25 0.25 0.35 0.33 0.40 0.43
EBIT/Interest Expenditure 16919.89 15651.26 15115.32 14915.84 14449.45 13560.87 12577.10 11732.55
CA/CL 0.83 0.84 0.82 0.81 1.02 1.63 1.54 1.48
MV/Total Assets 0.35 0.33 0.32 0.32 0.33 0.31 0.33 0.36
ln(MV) 1.24 1.33 1.36 1.35 1.37 1.34 1.37 1.33
ln(Total Assets) 1.42 1.46 1.43 1.43 1.45 1.41 1.45 1.48
Number of days in Chapter 11 343.12 341.21 345.38 352.86 348.49 346.18 332.80 325.22
Observations 59 69 74 76 82 92 109 125
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Minimum 
PRST 1984-1993 1984-1994 1984-1995 1984-1996 1984-1997 1984-1998 1984-1999
Default Spread 1.24 1.24 1.22 1.22 1.22 1.20 1.20 1.20
Term Spread 0.17 0.17 0.17 0.17 0.17 0.17 0.17 0.17
Net Profit/Total Assets -0.84 -0.84 -0.84 -0.84 -0.84 -1.93 -1.93 -3.83
EBITD/Total Assets -0.43 -0.44 -0.44 -0.44 -0.44 -1.73 -1.73 -2.54
Total Assets/Total Liabilities 0.15 0.15 0.15 0.15 0.15 0.15 0.15 0.15
MV/Total Liabilities 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
EBIT/Interest Expenditure -129877.50 -129877.50 -129877.50 -129877.50 -129877.50 -129877.50 -129877.50 -129877.50
CA/CL 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.02
MV/Total Assets 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00
ln(MV) -0.63 -0.63 -0.63 -0.63 -0.63 -0.63 -0.63 -0.63
ln(Total Assets) 1.25 1.25 1.25 1.25 1.25 1.25 1.25 1.25
Number of days in Chapter 11 44 44 35 35 35 35 28 28
Observations 59 69 74 76 82 92 109 125
 
 
Maximum 
PRST 1984-1993 1984-1994 1984-1995 1984-1996 1984-1997 1984-1998 1984-1999
Default Spread 2.77 2.77 2.77 2.77 2.77 2.77 2.77 2.77
Term Spread 4.60 4.60 4.60 4.60 4.60 4.60 4.60 4.60
Net Profit/Total Assets 0.03 0.03 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.10
EBITD/Total Assets 0.09 0.24 0.35 0.35 0.35 0.35 0.35 0.35
Total Assets/Total Liabilities 2.83 2.83 2.83 2.83 3.30 3.30 3.30 3.98
MV/Total Liabilities 1.05 1.43 1.43 1.43 2.44 2.44 2.53 2.53
EBIT/Interest Expenditure 18.13 18.13 18.13 18.13 18.13 18.13 18.13 18.13
CA/CL 4.51 4.51 4.51 4.51 6.75 13.55 13.55 13.55
MV/Total Assets 2.59 2.59 2.59 2.59 2.59 2.59 2.59 2.59
ln(MV) 4.79 4.93 4.95 4.95 5.49 5.49 5.49 5.49
ln(Total Assets) 7.41 8.94 8.94 8.94 8.94 8.94 8.94 8.94
Number of days in Chapter 11 1789 1789 1789 1789 1789 1789 1789 1789
Observations 59 69 74 76 82 92 109 125
 
 
Descriptive statistics over time. PRST represents the sample of 59 firms examined by Partington et al. (2001) spanning the period 1984-1993. Data was added to the sample on 
a yearly basis. The remaining columns are labelled according to the period covered by the sample. The number of observations in each sample is noted. Missing values were 
excluded from the calculations. Default Spread is the Moody’s BAA Corporate Bond Rate less the Treasury Bond Rate; Term Spread is the Treasury Bond rate less the 
Treasury Bill rate; Net Profit/Total Assets is the firm’s net profit divided by its total assets; EBITD/Total Assets is the firm’s earnings before interest, tax and depreciation 
divided by its total assets; Total Assets/Total Liabilities is the ratio of the firm’s total assets to its total liabilities; MV/Total Liabilities is the ratio of the firm’s market 
capitalisation to its total liabilities; EBIT/Interest Expense is the firm’s earnings before interest and tax divided by its interest expense; CA/CL is the ratio of the firm’s current 
assets to its current liabilities; MV/Total Assets is the ratio of the firm’s market capitalisation to its total assets; ln(MV) is the natural log of the firm’s market capitalisation; 
ln(Total Assets) is the natural log of the firm’s total assets; Number of days in Chapter 11 is the number of days between the firm’s date of filing and its date of exit from 
Chapter 11 proceedings. All covariates were measured prior to the firm’s entry into Chapter 11. 
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8.2. Model 5a: The removal of EBITD/Total Assets outliers 
 
The dramatic fall in mean (and in the minimum value) of EBITD/Total Assets in the 
final three years of the study suggested the entry, in those years, of firms which had 
suffered particularly heavy losses. To determine if this was the case, extreme 
EBITD/Total Assets outliers were removed from the dataset65. These outliers did not 
appear to be randomly distributed across the sample period but rather were systematic 
with respect to time, being found solely in the final three years of the study. An 
estimation of Model 4 (a calendar-time model with a Date-of-Filing indicator) with 
the outliers removed yielded the results in Table 21. 
Though the magnitudes of the EBITD/Total Assets coefficients continued to diminish 
throughout the sample period, there was a dramatic improvement in the stability of 
that covariate. In estimating this model, it was not the intention of the present study to 
assert that the instability of the model was a result of anomalies in the data, and that 
this issue was partly resolved by the removal of extreme outliers (indeed, the 
systematic nature of those outliers’ appearance would suggest otherwise). Rather, the 
argument presented is that the instability in the models, particularly in the 
EBITD/Total Assets covariate, may have been caused, in part, by the entry into 
Chapter 11 of several extremely poor performing firms in the period 1997 to 1999. 
Indeed, the entry of such firms in the later part of the sample period would also be 
consistent with a positive ‘calendar effect’. 
                                                 
65
 As per Wong et al. (2007), an extreme outlier was defined as an observation which was more than 
three inter-quartile ranges away from the 25th or 75th percentile observations. Following the example of 
Wong et al. (2007), the extreme EBITD/Total Assets outliers had not been removed during the dataset 
construction process. Wong et al. (2007) found that the removal of extreme outliers (including six 
extreme EBITD/Total Assets outliers) from their estimation sample did not affect their qualitative 
results. 
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Table 21: 
Model 5a: Calendar-time model with EBITD/Total Assets outliers removed 
 
PRST 1984-1993 1984-1994 1984-1995 1984-1996 1984-1997 1984-1998 1984-1999
Default Spread -10.96 -8.05 -7.93 -7.82 -3.03 -6.94 -1.22 -0.83
(0.24) (0.32) (0.33) (0.33) (0.65) (0.19) (0.73) (0.77)
EBITD/Total Assets -12.32 ** -5.01 ** -5.16 ** -4.84 ** -3.41 ** -3.55 ** -2.37 ** -2.27 **
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.03) (0.01) (0.04) (0.02)
ln(MV) -0.70 ** -0.65 ** -0.71 ** -0.68 ** -0.58 ** -0.53 ** -0.41 ** -0.37 **
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Date-of-Filing -0.0024 ** -0.0023 ** -0.0023 ** -0.0024 ** -0.0021 ** -0.0019 ** -0.0021 ** -0.0019 **
(0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Observations 59 69 74 76 82 89 102 115
 
 
** significant at 5%, * significant at 10%. 
Coefficient estimates (with p-values in parentheses) for the covariates in the three-variable model with a Date-of-Filing indicator. PRST represents the sample of 59 firms 
examined by Partington et al. (2001) spanning the period 1984-1993. Data was added to the sample on a yearly basis. The remaining columns are labelled according to the 
period covered by the sample. The number of observations in each sample is noted. Default Spread is the Moody’s BAA Corporate Bond Rate less the Treasury Bond Rate; 
EBITD/Total Assets is the firm’s earnings before interest, tax and depreciation divided by its total assets; ln(MV) is the natural log of the firm’s market capitalisation; Date-
of-Filing is the number of days between the firm’s Chapter 11 filing date and 1 January 1984. Extreme outlier observations of EBITD/Total Assets were removed (an extreme 
outlier was defined as an observation which was more than three inter-quartile ranges away from the 25th or 75th percentile observations). Default Spread in the time-
dependent model was measured monthly for duration of the firm’s Chapter 11 proceedings; all other covariates were measured prior to the firm’s entry into Chapter 11. 
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8.3. Model 5b: Accounting for the interaction between liquidity and solvency 
risk 
 
The changing levels of EBIT/Total Assets and Current Assets/Current Liabilities 
throughout the sample period were indicative of changes in the long-term (solvency) 
and short-term (liquidity) risk structures (for which those ratios commonly proxy) 
faced by Chapter 11 filing firms. 
In Bryan et al. (2002), solvency and liquidity risk and their impacts on bankruptcy 
emergence were examined through a logit model. High solvency risk firms were, it 
was contended, less likely to emerge from bankruptcy. However, the level of solvency 
risk also reflected the tightness of constraints placed on a filing firm by its creditors, 
and thus the level of assets which could have been protected by the early intervention 
of those parties. Whether those protected assets, forming the capital base necessary 
for emergence from bankruptcy, were sufficiently liquid for the firm’s continued 
operation (that is, the level of liquidity risk) was the second issue. Hence there was an 
interaction between solvency and liquidity risk which needed to be addressed. 
Bryan et al. (2002) partitioned firms into four combinations of high and low levels of 
solvency and liquidity risk66 and assigned indicator variables to each combination 
(HH, HL, LH, LL). LH (low solvency risk and high liquidity risk) and LL were both 
significant, with the former producing the greatest likelihood of emergence since, it 
was argued, the filing was likely to have been due to a restrictive debt covenant which 
could be re-negotiated or alternatively, new financing could be readily sought by the 
low-solvency-risk firm. Bryan et al. (2002) posited that effect of low liquidity 
together with low solvency risk was less certain since the decision of filing for 
bankruptcy was likely to have been a strategic one. Though statistically insignificant, 
firms with high solvency and high liquidity risk were least likely to emerge. The 
                                                 
66
 As proxied by the interest coverage ratio and the quick ratio (current assets less inventory divided by 
current liabilities), respectively. The quick ratio was used in place of a current ratio since, as Bryan et 
al. (2002) contended, inventories were slow moving and were unlikely to assist a firm in satisfying 
short-term creditors. By reason of data restrictions, this same step could not be taken in the present 
study.  
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model was found to outperform one which did not account for solvency or liquidity 
risk. 
Following Bryan et al. (2002), EBIT/Interest Expense and Current Assets/Current 
Liabilities were partitioned with respect to their median values67. HH, HL and LH 
indicators were added to Model 5a.  As Table 22 highlights, the contentions of Bryan 
et al. (2002) found little support in the present model. HH was the only statistically 
significant risk indicator, but even then, only with the addition of observations from 
the last two years of the study. Nevertheless, the positive impact of HH on the hazard 
of emergence with no value for shareholders was consistent with the contention by 
Bryan et al. (2002) that high liquidity risk prevented a firm from continuing 
operations without new financing, which was not readily accessible by a firm with 
high solvency risk. Though any conclusions from this model must be drawn 
tentatively, that HH was only significant in the final years of the study was perhaps, 
again, reflective of some change in the nature of the firms filing for Chapter 11. 
Specifically, the results suggested the possible entry in the final two years of the study 
of firms which were exposed to actually (rather than relatively) high levels of stress. 
At the risk of repetition, such an assertion must be treated with caution. 
                                                 
67
 Median values of EBIT/Interest Expense and Current Assets/Current Liabilities were calculated for 
each sub-sample. A firm with an EBIT/Interest Expense less than the median value in a sub-sample was 
deemed to have experienced high solvency risk during that period. Similarly, a firm with a ratio of 
Current Assets/Current Liabilities less than the median value in a sub-sample was deemed to have been 
subject to high liquidity risk during that period. 
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 Table 22: 
Model 5b: Accounting for the interaction between liquidity and solvency risk 
 
PRST 1984-1993 1984-1994 1984-1995 1984-1996 1984-1997 1984-1998 1984-1999
Default Spread -12.26 -7.74 -7.60 -7.47 -3.25 -6.33 -1.15 -0.91
(0.20) (0.35) (0.35) (0.36) (0.62) (0.23) (0.74) (0.75)
EBITD/Total Assets -14.56 ** -4.78 ** -4.91 ** -4.60 ** -2.67 * -3.04 ** -2.12 * -2.10 **
(0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.10) (0.04) (0.07) (0.04)
ln(MV) -0.67 ** -0.62 ** -0.68 ** -0.65 ** -0.57 ** -0.51 ** -0.41 ** -0.36 **
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Date-of-Filing -0.0025 ** -0.0024 ** -0.0024 ** -0.0025 ** -0.0024 ** -0.0021 ** -0.0023 ** -0.0020 **
(0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
HH -1.31 0.71 0.75 0.80 1.14 1.05 1.18 * 1.08 *
(0.40) (0.45) (0.43) (0.39) (0.13) (0.15) (0.10) (0.08)
HL -0.25 0.08 0.16 0.09 -14.52 -14.43 -14.58 -14.48
(0.83) (0.94) (0.89) (0.94) (0.99) (0.99) (0.99) (0.99)
LH 0.03 0.17 0.18 0.20 -0.02 0.02 0.06 0.11
(0.96) (0.74) (0.71) (0.68) (0.97) (0.96) (0.86) (0.73)
Observations 59 69 74 76 82 89 102 115
 
 
** significant at 5%, * significant at 10%. 
Coefficient estimates (with p-values in parentheses) for the covariates in a model containing liquidity and solvency risk interaction indicators. PRST represents the sample of 
59 firms examined by Partington et al. (2001) spanning the period 1984-1993. Data was added to the sample on a yearly basis. The remaining columns are labelled according 
to the period covered by the sample. The number of observations in each sample is noted. Default Spread is the Moody’s BAA Corporate Bond Rate less the Treasury Bond 
Rate; EBITD/Total Assets is the firm’s earnings before interest, tax and depreciation divided by its total assets; ln(MV) is the natural log of the firm’s market capitalisation; 
Date-of-Filing is the number of days between the firm’s Chapter 11 filing date and 1 January 1984; HH has a value of one if the firm has high solvency risk and high liquidity 
risk and zero otherwise; HL has a value of one if the firm has high solvency risk and low liquidity risk and zero otherwise; LH has a value of one if the firm has low solvency 
risk and high liquidity risk and zero otherwise. In each sub-sample, a firm has high solvency risk if its EBIT/Interest Expense is less than the median value and high liquidity 
risk if its CA/CL is less than the median value. Extreme outlier observations of EBITD/Total Assets were removed (an extreme outlier was defined as an observation which 
was more than three inter-quartile ranges away from the 25th or 75th percentile observations). Default Spread was measured monthly for duration of the firm’s Chapter 11 
proceedings; all other covariates were measured prior to the firm’s entry into Chapter 11. 
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8.4. Model 5c: Controlling for industry membership 
 
The forgone has identified a changing face of firms entering Chapter 11 protection. In 
the final inquiry of this nature, the effect of a firm’s industry on the outcome of 
Chapter 11 proceedings was examined. Unlike the previous two models, there was no 
underlying theory to suggest that some industries were more prone to emerging from 
Chapter 11 than others. However, industry effects have long been identified as having 
some impact on the Chapter 11 process. 
 
8.4.1. Background 
Acharya et al. (2007) considered defaulted firms from 1982 to 1999 and found that 
creditors recovered significantly lower amounts in present value terms when the 
industry of the defaulted firm was in distress. In this study, a ‘distressed’ industry was 
defined as one whose median stock return was less than or equal to -30%. The study’s 
findings were attributed to a ‘fire-sale’ effect introduced by Shleifer and Vishny 
(1992). Under that theory, creditors recovered less from a firm in a distressed industry 
as a result of the ‘fire-sale’ prices for which assets of the defaulted firm could be sold. 
This was particularly true if the non-defaulted firms in the industry were illiquid, and 
if the industry was characterised by ‘specific’ assets not easily deployable by other 
industries. Accordingly, defaulted firms in distressed industries were more likely to 
emerge as restructured firms rather than be sold to sub-optimal alternative users or be 
liquidated. However, they also spent a longer time in bankruptcy as creditors sought 
further bids for the firm or its assets. 
Acharya et al. (2007) dealt with creditor recoveries and therefore the outcome for 
existing shareholders, even given emergence, was less clear. Furthermore, the dataset 
available in the present study did not allow for the same depth level of analysis. 
However, despite not being able to recognise a specific industry characteristic68, 
studies such as Chava and Jarrow (2004) (a distress prediction model) nevertheless 
                                                 
68
 Other examples include industry operating performance as was studied by Denis and Rogers (2007), 
or industry capacity utilisation per Bandopadhyaya (1994). 
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found that controlling for industry membership significantly altered both the slope and 
intercept coefficients of their models of interest. In any case, the abundance of theory 
on industry-related effects on bankruptcy (for example, the contagion and competitive 
effects of Hertzel et al., 2006; and the fire-sale effect of Shleifer and Vishny, 1992) 
suggested that it would be prudent to acknowledge industry membership in 
bankruptcy prediction models. 
 
8.4.2. Industry groupings 
The firms were categorised based on their Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) 
codes69 into the eight industry groups identified by Bryan et al. (2002)70. Table 23 
describes the composition, by industry, of firms filing for Chapter 11 in each sub-
sample. An indicator was assigned to each industry group (with the base case being 
any firm not captured by those groups). The indicators were added to Model 5a (the 
calendar-time model with outlier EBITD/Total Assets observations removed). Again, 
the reason this model was used was so as to discern the impact of the subject 
investigated, in this case industry, from the systematic duration and calendar effects of 
time. 
 
 
                                                 
69
 http://www.sec.gov/info/edgar/siccodes.htm provides an outline of how SIC codes are organised. 
70
 The Chava and Jarrow (2004) four-industry grouping of manufacturing and mineral (sic 1000-1500, 
2000-4000), transportation, communications and utilities (4000-5000), finance, insurance and real 
estate (6000-6800) was also applied but only one industry (manufacturing and mineral) was significant, 
and even then only in one (the 1984-1993) sub-sample.  
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Table 23: 
Composition by industry 
 
SIC PRST 1984-1993 1984-1994 1984-1995 1984-1996 1984-1997 1984-1998 1984-1999
Agriculture 100-900 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
Mining and Construction 1000-1999 5 6 7 7 7 7 7 11
Commodity 2000-2999 6 8 8 8 9 9 11 15
Manufacturing 3000-3999 16 19 21 22 24 24 28 28
Transport 4000-4899 4 5 5 5 5 7 8 10
Wholesale and Retail 5000-5999 14 16 18 19 21 27 34 37
Financial Services 6000-6999 4 5 5 5 5 5 5 5
Other Services 7000-8999 6 6 6 6 7 9 11 12
Total 57 67 72 74 80 90 106 120
 
Composition of sample by industry based on the eight industry groups identified by Bryan et al. (2002) (miscellaneous industries excluded). SIC is the Standard Industrial 
Classification range of codes for each industry. PRST represents the sample of 59 firms examined by Partington et al. (2001) spanning the period 1984-1993. Data was added 
to the sample on a yearly basis. The remaining columns are labelled according to the period covered by the sample. 
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Table 24: 
Model 5c: Controlling for industry membership 
 
PRST 1984-1993 1984-1994 1984-1995 1984-1996 1984-1997 1984-1998 1984-1999
Default Spread -9.36 -6.51 -6.72 -6.79 -2.06 -6.57 -1.00 -0.81
(0.36) (0.44) (0.42) (0.41) (0.76) (0.22) (0.78) (0.78)
EBITD/Total Assets -13.26 ** -6.12 ** -6.21 ** -5.97 ** -3.79 ** -3.86 ** -2.83 ** -2.53 **
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02)
ln(MV) -0.78 ** -0.77 ** -0.82 ** -0.80 ** -0.63 ** -0.58 ** -0.44 ** -0.38 **
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Date-of-Filing -0.0034 ** -0.0034 ** -0.0032 ** -0.0033 ** -0.0025 ** -0.0022 ** -0.0023 ** -0.0020 **
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Transport 1.12 1.90 ** 1.74 ** 1.72 ** 1.25 * 1.40 ** 0.98 * 0.69
(0.20) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.06) (0.02) (0.09) (0.22)
Wholesale and Retail 1.29 ** 1.35 ** 1.14 ** 1.07 ** 0.44 0.15 0.21 0.11
(0.02) (0.01) (0.03) (0.03) (0.33) (0.72) (0.56) (0.72)
Observations 59 69 74 76 82 89 102 115
 
 
** significant at 5%, * significant at 10%. 
Coefficient estimates (with p-values in parentheses) for the covariates in a model containing liquidity and solvency risk interaction indicators. PRST represents the sample of 
59 firms examined by Partington et al. (2001) spanning the period 1984-1993. Data was added to the sample on a yearly basis. The remaining columns are labelled according 
to the period covered by the sample. The number of observations in each sample is noted. Default Spread is the Moody’s BAA Corporate Bond Rate less the Treasury Bond 
Rate; EBITD/Total Assets is the firm’s earnings before interest, tax and depreciation divided by its total assets; ln(MV) is the natural log of the firm’s market capitalisation; 
Date-of-Filing is the number of days between the firm’s Chapter 11 filing date and 1 January 1984; Transport has a value of one if the firm has a SIC code of 4000-4899 and 
zero otherwise; Wholesale and Retail has a value of one if the firm has SIC code of 5000-5999 and zero otherwise. Extreme outlier observations of EBITD/Total Assets were 
removed (an extreme outlier was defined as an observation which was more than three inter-quartile ranges away from the 25th or 75th percentile observations). Default 
Spread was measured monthly for duration of the firm’s Chapter 11 proceedings; all other covariates were measured prior to the firm’s entry into Chapter 11. 
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8.4.3. Results 
With all eight indicators applied, none were found to be significant. Thus, the model 
was re-estimated with covariates chosen through stepwise selection (at a 10% level of 
significance). The results set out in Table 24 identify the Wholesale and Retail 
industry as one in which firms filing for Chapter 11 had a higher hazard of exiting 
with no value for existing shareholders. That indicator’s loss of statistical significance 
in the final sub-periods coincided with a marked increase in the number of firms filing 
for Chapter 11 bankruptcy from the Wholesale and Retail industry and therefore could 
possibly be explained by a greater variance in the characteristics of filing firms from 
that industry. Firms from the Transport industry also faced a greater hazard of exiting 
Chapter 11 with no value for shareholders. Like the Wholesale and Retail industry 
indicator, the Transport industry indicator was not consistently significant throughout 
the period under examination. 
 
8.5. The changing face of Chapter 11 filing firms: A summary of findings 
 
Table 25 summarises the results from this section and provides a glimpse of the 
changing face of firms filing for Chapter 11 bankruptcy during the sample period71. 
The effects of removing the EBITD/Total Assets outliers and of adding risk indicators 
offered some possible reasons for the positive ‘calendar effect’. Specifically, the 
increasing hazard of a firm emerging from Chapter 11 with no value for its existing 
shareholders could be, in part, attributed to the possible entry of abnormally poor 
performers and firms with high risk structures in the final years of the period 
examined. The former may also have contributed to some of the instability in the 
EBITD/Total Assets coefficients. Such comments are by no means definitive and 
indeed, the experience with both the risk-indicator and industry-indicator models 
suggest that any assertions regarding their effects on the Chapter 11 process should be 
treated with caution and with the sample period constantly in mind. 
                                                 
71
 When the extreme outlier observations of EBITD/Total Assets were retained in the model, the 
impacts of the HH indicator and the two industry indicators were not greatly altered (see Appendix L). 
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Table 25: 
Summary of Model 5 findings 
 
PRST 1984-1993 1984-1994 1984-1995 1984-1996 1984-1997 1984-1998 1984-1999
EBITD/Total Assets -14.19 ** -6.38 ** -6.29 ** -5.99 ** -3.39 ** -3.42 ** -2.55 ** -2.39 **
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.05) (0.02) (0.04) (0.02)
ln(MV) -0.77 ** -0.80 ** -0.84 ** -0.81 ** -0.64 ** -0.58 ** -0.42 ** -0.37 **
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Date-of-Filing -0.0028 ** -0.0027 ** -0.0027 ** -0.0027 ** -0.0020 ** -0.0020 ** -0.0018 ** -0.0016 **
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
HH -0.42 1.24 1.18 1.17 1.33 * 1.26 * 1.22 * 1.11 *
(0.77) (0.19) (0.22) (0.22) (0.07) (0.08) (0.08) (0.06)
Transport 1.00 1.83 ** 1.67 ** 1.65 ** 1.29 * 1.47 ** 1.00 * 0.75
(0.25) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.06) (0.01) (0.09) (0.19)
Wholesale and Retail 1.34 ** 1.50 ** 1.29 ** 1.22 ** 0.59 0.38 0.32 0.23
(0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.19) (0.35) (0.37) (0.46)
Observations 59 69 74 76 82 89 102 115
 
 
** significant at 5%, * significant at 10%. 
Coefficient estimates (with p-values in parentheses) for the covariates in a model containing liquidity and solvency risk interaction indicators. PRST represents the sample of 
59 firms examined by Partington et al. (2001) spanning the period 1984-1993. Data was added to the sample on a yearly basis. The remaining columns are labelled according 
to the period covered by the sample. The number of observations in each sample is noted. Default Spread is the Moody’s BAA Corporate Bond Rate less the Treasury Bond 
Rate; EBITD/Total Assets is the firm’s earnings before interest, tax and depreciation divided by its total assets; ln(MV) is the natural log of the firm’s market capitalisation; 
Date-of-Filing is the number of days between the firm’s Chapter 11 filing date and 1 January 1984; HH has a value of one if the firm has high solvency risk and high liquidity 
risk and zero otherwise; HL has a value of one if the firm has high solvency risk and low liquidity risk and zero otherwise; LH has a value of one if the firm has low solvency 
risk and high liquidity risk and zero otherwise; Transport has a value of one if the firm has a SIC code of 4000-4899 and zero otherwise; Wholesale and Retail has a value of 
one if the firm has SIC code of 5000-5999 and zero otherwise. In each sub-sample, a firm has high solvency risk if its EBIT/Interest Expense is less than the median value 
and high liquidity risk if its CA/CL is less than the median value. Extreme outlier observations of EBITD/Total Assets were removed (an extreme outlier was defined as an 
observation which was more than three inter-quartile ranges away from the 25th or 75th percentile observations). Default Spread was measured monthly for duration of the 
firm’s Chapter 11 proceedings; all other covariates were measured prior to the firm’s entry into Chapter 11. 
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9. Conclusion 
 
Over the past decade, the area of bankruptcy prediction and indeed financial research 
in general has seen an evolution towards the use of survival analysis. The growing 
popularity of this application can primarily be attributed to its ability to explicitly 
recognise both censored data and the duration dependence of expected outcomes. 
However, much of its capability remains unexplored. Set on the stage of Chapter 11 
corporate bankruptcies in the US, a small step was taken towards an inquiry into what 
survival analysis can do, and what it cannot. 
Confining the ambit of its inquiry, the present study looked to a specification of Cox’s 
proportional hazards model proposed by Partington et al. (2001). The model, 
concerned with a firm’s hazard of exiting from Chapter 11 proceedings with no value 
for its shareholders, was found to be highly sensitive to the period under examination 
when tested against an extended sample by Wong et al. (2007). With the evidence 
pointing to some unobserved heterogeneity in the data not previously controlled for, 
the dataset from the original studies was re-examined. In the series of investigations to 
follow, multicollinearity and the impact of systematic as well as non-systematic 
factors throughout the sample period were proffered as possible drivers of the 
underlying model instability. 
Two model specifications were initially examined. First, the eleven-variable model 
proposed by Partington et al. (2001) was estimated over a dataset of 125 filing firms 
during the period 1984 to 1999. Second, a proportional hazards model incorporating 
time-dependent market-wide covariates was estimated. The latter model provided for 
a more contemporaneous reflection of the economic climate and its changes 
throughout a firm’s duration in Chapter 11. Further, the time-dependent model was 
proposed to test whether findings by the original studies of an ‘anomalous’ market-
wide Default Spread covariate could be explained by some level of mean-reversion in 
interest rates throughout a firm’s life in Chapter 11. 
Both models were found to be unstable and highly sensitive to the period examined, 
with the Default Spread covariate continuing to carry a ‘wrong sign’ even in the time-
dependent model. Through forward stepwise estimation and an examination of the 
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correlation matrix, the covariate set was streamlined to a set of three covariates. The 
streamlined set comprised of two firm-specific covariates (measuring earnings and 
market capitalisation) and one market-wide covariate (Default Spread, measuring the 
general level of credit risk in the economy). The three covariates were consistently 
statistically significant in the conventional proportional hazards model, though the 
economic significance of the firm-specific covariates diminished throughout the 
sample period. The time-dependent model experienced similar results but the 
instability now extended to Default Spread, which became redundant when 
observations from the final years of the sample period were added. There were two 
plausible explanations. First, market-wide factors were truly redundant in predicting 
Chapter 11 resolution. Alternatively, this result was caused by an inability to consider 
time-dependent firm-specific responses to changes in the economy. Confronted with 
no desirable options, and with an unstable model still in its hands, the present study 
looked to the experience from medical research and borrowed a ‘calendar-time 
model’.  
Survival analysis models are able, through their arrangement of failures, to account 
for the effects of time on a hazard. The popularity of Cox’s proportional hazards 
model and the reason for its use by Partington et al. (2001) rested, in part, on its 
ability to dispense with the need to explicitly model those effects by capturing them in 
an underlying hazard function which could remain unspecified. By exploiting this 
property of Cox’s partial likelihood estimation, the calendar-model allowed its 
covariates to be estimated and analysed in isolation from both the duration and the 
calendar effects of time. It was able to do so by arranging failures according to 
calendar-time and then truncating them on the left so as to remove firms from the risk-
set (and therefore hazard calculations) when they had yet to file for Chapter 11. In this 
way, the duration dependence of the hazard and the influences of a changing Chapter 
11 environment (economic or otherwise) could both be subsumed into the unspecified 
underlying hazard function. 
By this arrangement, the time-dependent market-wide covariate (along with its 
confounding effects) was eliminated from the model estimation process, and the firm-
specific covariates able to be estimated in isolation of the systematic effects of time. 
Though the two firm-specific covariates examined remained fairly consistently 
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statistically significant, their economic significance continued to diminish. Uncertain 
as to whether there had in fact been a ‘calendar effect’ to control for, a Date-of-Filing 
indicator was added to the calendar-time model. Based on linear representations of the 
‘duration effect’ and the ‘calendar effect’, two tentative conclusions were drawn. First, 
the experience in this sample suggested that the longer the time spent by a firm in 
Chapter 11, the higher its hazard of emergence with no value for shareholders. 
Second, the later in the 1984 to 1999 period a firm entered Chapter 11, the higher was 
its hazard.  
With the systematic effects of time controlled for, and still an unstable model, the 
present study looked to the ‘changing face’ of Chapter 11 filing firms for non-
systematic drivers of the instability in firm-specific covariates. Through an 
examination the descriptive statistics, an evolution in the nature of filing firms over 
the sample period was noticed. Several findings were made. The final three years of 
the sample period saw the entry of several abnormally poor performing firms into 
Chapter 11, offering one reason for the instability of the EBITD/Total Assets covariate 
which was also consistent with a positive ‘calendar effect’. Contentions by Bryan et 
al. (2002) regarding the interaction between liquidity and solvency risk as well as 
assertions (by, for example, Chava and Jarrow, 2004) regarding the effects of industry 
membership were also considered. Though found to have some merit, indicators 
designed to give effect to the two contentions were sensitive to the period examined. 
A number of lessons were learnt from the experience of Partington et al. (2001) and 
Wong et al. (2007). The need to account for the duration dependence of expected 
outcomes is widely recognised in bankruptcy research, and is often cited as the reason 
for applying survival analysis. What of calendar dependence and the effects of a 
changing environment? With the nature of that effect unknown, but nevertheless a 
need to control for all systematic effects of time, Cox’s partial likelihood method was 
exploited to enable the present study to control for the ‘calendar effect’ without 
explicitly modelling it. The cost of this analytical approach was that coefficient 
estimations, abstracted from such effects of time, also retained little predictive value. 
In future studies, one may wish to explore the nature of the ‘calendar effect’ and its 
impact on the resolution of Chapter 11 proceedings. In that instance, it may be useful 
to incorporate time-dependent indicators of calendar year into an event-time model. 
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Such indicators would evolve throughout a firm’s life in Chapter 11 and may provide 
some insight into the nature of the changing environment. 
The results of present study suggest a need to be constantly mindful of the sample 
examined. Assertions regarding the significance of certain factors as determinants of 
Chapter 11 outcome are not insensitive to the data or the period considered, and the 
predictive abilities of models will be hampered by the impacts of non-systematic 
factors through time. Only with those issues and limitations in mind can one then look 
to the future of bankruptcy modelling. One possible path would be to extend existing 
survival analysis models to consider a wider range of outcomes from Chapter 11. 
While static models of bankruptcy resolution such as the logistic regression models of 
Barniv et al. (2002) have identified and examined a variety of means by which firms 
can exit from Chapter 11 (for example, liquidation, acquisition, or reorganisation), 
survival analysis studies have tended to restrict themselves to dichotomous outcomes. 
However, this need not be the case. Many survival analysis models, including Cox’s 
proportional hazards model, are in fact able to handle ‘competing risks’. ‘Competing 
risk’ models are a class of models whereby an individual can be exposed to a number 
of event types. Occurrence of one type of event removes that individual from being at 
risk of experiencing any other event type. Though this may be an appropriate next 
step for models of bankruptcy resolution, the present reluctance to take that step may 
be due, in part, to the more onerous data requirements of ‘competing risk’ models. 
The use of survival analysis in financial research has vast potential. Its limitations, 
however, cannot be ignored. The present study has offered a glimpse at the 
capabilities and the boundaries of one type of survival analysis specification in one 
particular context. Undoubtedly, it will not be long before more of the survival 
analysis puzzle is pieced together. 
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Appendix A: 
Estimating the Wong et al. (2007) 5-variable model 
 
PRST 1984-1993 1984-1994 1984-1995 1984-1996 1984-1997 1984-1998 1984-1999
Default Spread -3.01 ** -1.31 -1.83 ** -1.69 ** -2.13 ** -2.09 ** -1.53 ** -1.17 **
(0.01) (0.12) (0.03) (0.02) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Term Spread 0.06 0.19 0.10 0.12 0.00 -0.03 -0.06 -0.15
(0.77) (0.40) (0.66) (0.53) (1.00) (0.87) (0.65) (0.23)
EBITD/Total Assets -19.14 ** -5.67 ** -3.51 * -4.23 ** -3.82 ** -1.09 ** -1.14 ** -0.64 **
(0.00) (0.01) (0.08) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.02)
CA/CL -0.92 * -0.62 * -0.57 -0.46 -0.48 * -0.09 -0.10 -0.11
(0.06) (0.10) (0.11) (0.18) (0.08) (0.29) (0.27) (0.23)
ln(MV) -0.85 ** -0.67 ** -0.53 ** -0.57 ** -0.51 ** -0.47 ** -0.40 ** -0.34 **
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Observations 59 69 74 76 82 93 109 125
 
** significant at 5%, * significant at 10%. 
Coefficient estimates (with p-values in parentheses) for the covariates in Wong et al. (2007) five-variable. PRST represents the sample of 59 firms examined by Partington et 
al. (2001) spanning the period 1984-1993. Data was added to the sample on a yearly basis. The remaining columns are labelled according to the period covered by the 
sample. The number of observations in each sample is noted. Default Spread is the Moody’s BAA Corporate Bond Rate less the Treasury Bond Rate; Term Spread is the 
Treasury Bond rate less the Treasury Bill rate; EBITD/Total Assets is the firm’s earnings before interest, tax and depreciation divided by its total assets; CA/CL is the ratio of 
the firm’s current assets to its current liabilities; ln(MV) is the natural log of the firm’s market capitalisation. All covariates were measured prior to the firm’s entry into 
Chapter 11. 
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Appendix B: 
Stepwise selection estimation of Model 1 (5% level of significance) 
 
PRST 1984-1993 1984-1994 1984-1995 1984-1996 1984-1997 1984-1998 1984-1999
Default Spread -3.30792 -1.95695 -2.50507 -2.08849 -2.21862 -1.88339 -1.42667 -1.08232
Term Spread
Net Profit/Total Assets -1.13088 -1.15268 -0.53936
EBITD/Total Assets -19.07022 -4.50593 -3.99713 -3.00826
Total Assets/Total Liabilities
MV/Total Liabilities 1.56788
EBIT/Interest Expenditure
CA/CL
MV/Total Assets
ln(MV) -0.87395 -0.68684 -0.47642 -0.69682 -0.55519 -0.48585 -0.39999 -0.33068
ln(Total Assets)
Observations 59 69 74 76 82 93 109 125
(59) (69) (74) (76) (81) (91) (106) (122)
 
 
Forward stepwise estimation (at a 5% level of significance) based on the eleven covariates proposed by Partington et al. (2001). PRST represents the sample of 59 firms 
examined by Partington et al. (2001) spanning the period 1984-1993. Data was added to the sample on a yearly basis. The remaining columns are labelled according to the 
period covered by the sample. The number of observations in each sample is noted (with the number of observations with complete data in parentheses). Default Spread is the 
Moody’s BAA Corporate Bond Rate less the Treasury Bond Rate; Term Spread is the Treasury Bond rate less the Treasury Bill rate; Net Profit/Total Assets is the firm’s net 
profit divided by its total assets; EBITD/Total Assets is the firm’s earnings before interest, tax and depreciation divided by its total assets; Total Assets/Total Liabilities is the 
ratio of the firm’s total assets to its total liabilities; MV/Total Liabilities is the ratio of the firm’s market capitalisation to its total liabilities; EBIT/Interest Expense is the 
firm’s earnings before interest and tax divided by its interest expense; CA/CL is the ratio of the firm’s current assets to its current liabilities; MV/Total Assets is the ratio of 
the firm’s market capitalisation to its total assets; ln(MV) is the natural log of the firm’s market capitalisation; ln(Total Assets) is the natural log of the firm’s total assets. All 
covariates were measured prior to the firm’s entry into Chapter 11. 
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Appendix C: 
Stepwise selection estimation of Model 2 (5% level of significance) 
 
PRST 1984-1993 1984-1994 1984-1995 1984-1996 1984-1997 1984-1998 1984-1999
Default Spread
Term Spread -0.20772 -0.22741
Net Profit/Total Assets -2.08625 -2.12102 -2.16318 -1.43211 -1.39488
EBITD/Total Assets -13.20674 -5.72865 -0.55482
Total Assets/Total Liabilities
MV/Total Liabilities
EBIT/Interest Expenditure
CA/CL
MV/Total Assets
ln(MV) -0.78061 -0.73053 -0.60772 -0.6066 -0.56358 -0.56985 -0.40511 -0.33456
ln(Total Assets)
Observations 59 69 74 76 82 93 109 125
(59) (69) (74) (76) (81) (91) (106) (122)
 
 
Forward stepwise estimation (at a 5% level of significance) based on the eleven covariates proposed by Partington et al. (2001). PRST represents the sample of 59 firms 
examined by Partington et al. (2001) spanning the period 1984-1993. Data was added to the sample on a yearly basis. The remaining columns are labelled according to the 
period covered by the sample. The number of observations in each sample is noted (with the number of observations with complete data in parentheses). Default Spread is the 
Moody’s BAA Corporate Bond Rate less the Treasury Bond Rate; Term Spread is the Treasury Bond rate less the Treasury Bill rate; Net Profit/Total Assets is the firm’s net 
profit divided by its total assets; EBITD/Total Assets is the firm’s earnings before interest, tax and depreciation divided by its total assets; Total Assets/Total Liabilities is the 
ratio of the firm’s total assets to its total liabilities; MV/Total Liabilities is the ratio of the firm’s market capitalisation to its total liabilities; EBIT/Interest Expense is the 
firm’s earnings before interest and tax divided by its interest expense; CA/CL is the ratio of the firm’s current assets to its current liabilities; MV/Total Assets is the ratio of 
the firm’s market capitalisation to its total assets; ln(MV) is the natural log of the firm’s market capitalisation; ln(Total Assets) is the natural log of the firm’s total assets. 
Default Spread and Term Spread were measured monthly for duration of the firm’s Chapter 11 proceedings: all other covariates were measured prior to the firm’s entry into 
Chapter 11. 
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Appendix D: 
Model 1: Conventional proportional hazards (six-variable) model (using Net Profit/Total Assets) 
 
PRST 1984-1993 1984-1994 1984-1995 1984-1996 1984-1997 1984-1998 1984-1999
Default Spread -2.45 ** -1.65 ** -2.01 ** -1.67 ** -1.91 ** -2.02 ** -1.55 ** -1.14 **
(0.00) (0.03) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Net Profit/Total Assets -6.97 ** -2.90 ** -2.00 -2.75 ** -3.02 ** -1.22 ** -1.25 ** -0.53 **
(0.00) (0.05) (0.15) (0.03) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01)
EBIT/Interest Expenditure 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
(0.79) (0.73) (0.93) (0.79) (0.94) (0.82) (0.96) (0.99)
CA/CL -0.67 -0.58 -0.57 -0.41 -0.38 -0.09 -0.10 -0.09
(0.13) (0.13) (0.13) (0.25) (0.16) (0.28) (0.28) (0.29)
MV/Total Assets -2.36 ** -0.95 * -0.72 -0.82 * -0.95 ** -0.31 -0.42 -0.06
(0.00) (0.07) (0.16) (0.10) (0.04) (0.38) (0.26) (0.84)
ln(MV) -0.62 ** -0.58 ** -0.48 ** -0.57 ** -0.54 ** -0.52 ** -0.42 ** -0.34 **
(0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Observations 59 69 74 76 82 93 109 125
(59) (69) (74) (76) (81) (92) (106) (122)
 
** significant at 5%, * significant at 10%. 
Coefficient estimates (with p-values in parentheses) for the covariates in the six-variable model. PRST represents the sample of 59 firms examined by Partington et al. (2001) 
spanning the period 1984-1993. Data was added to the sample on a yearly basis. The remaining columns are labelled according to the period covered by the sample. The 
number of observations in each sample is noted (with the number of observations with complete data in parentheses). Default Spread is the Moody’s BAA Corporate Bond 
Rate less the Treasury Bond Rate; Net Profit/Total Assets is the firm’s net profit divided by its total assets; EBIT/Interest Expense is the firm’s earnings before interest and tax 
divided by its interest expense; CA/CL is the ratio of the firm’s current assets to its current liabilities; MV/Total Assets is the ratio of the firm’s market capitalisation to its 
total assets; ln(MV) is the natural log of the firm’s market capitalisation. All covariates were measured prior to the firm’s entry into Chapter 11. 
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Appendix E: 
Model 2: Time-dependent proportional hazards (six-variable) model (using Net Profit/Total Assets) 
 
PRST 1984-1993 1984-1994 1984-1995 1984-1996 1984-1997 1984-1998 1984-1999
Default Spread -2.05 * -1.50 -1.75 * -1.26 -1.24 -0.36 -0.19 0.18
(0.09) (0.14) (0.08) (0.15) (0.13) (0.52) (0.61) (0.58)
Net Profit/Total Assets -5.39 ** -3.46 ** -2.73 ** -3.03 ** -3.30 ** -1.47 ** -1.44 ** -0.40 **
(0.00) (0.01) (0.03) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.04)
EBIT/Interest Expenditure 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
(0.80) (0.60) (0.74) (0.67) (0.81) (0.69) (0.81) (0.78)
CA/CL -0.92 * -0.70 * -0.67 * -0.50 -0.45 -0.06 -0.07 -0.06
(0.05) (0.07) (0.07) (0.14) (0.11) (0.53) (0.46) (0.47)
MV/Total Assets -1.72 ** -1.01 ** -0.80 -0.81 -0.91 ** -0.20 -0.30 0.12
(0.01) (0.05) (0.11) (0.10) (0.05) (0.58) (0.43) (0.72)
ln(MV) -0.62 ** -0.59 ** -0.50 ** -0.55 ** -0.51 ** -0.52 ** -0.41 ** -0.34 **
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Observations 59 69 74 76 82 93 109 125
(59) (69) (74) (76) (81) (92) (106) (122)
 
 
** significant at 5%, * significant at 10%. 
Coefficient estimates (with p-values in parentheses) for the covariates in the six-variable model. PRST represents the sample of 59 firms examined by Partington et al. (2001) 
spanning the period 1984-1993. Data was added to the sample on a yearly basis. The remaining columns are labelled according to the period covered by the sample. The 
number of observations in each sample is noted (with the number of observations with complete data in parentheses). Default Spread is the Moody’s BAA Corporate Bond 
Rate less the Treasury Bond Rate; Net Profit/Total Assets is the firm’s net profit divided by its total assets; EBIT/Interest Expense is the firm’s earnings before interest and tax 
divided by its interest expense; CA/CL is the ratio of the firm’s current assets to its current liabilities; MV/Total Assets is the ratio of the firm’s market capitalisation to its 
total assets; ln(MV) is the natural log of the firm’s market capitalisation. Default Spread was measured monthly for duration of the firm’s Chapter 11 proceedings: all other 
covariates were measured prior to the firm’s entry into Chapter 11. 
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Appendix F: 
Model 3: Calendar-time model 
 
PRST 1984-1993 1984-1994 1984-1995 1984-1996 1984-1997 1984-1998 1984-1999
Default Spread -5.01 -6.97 -7.27 -7.95 -4.35 -7.19 -0.56 -0.07
(0.62) (0.39) (0.38) (0.34) (0.52) (0.13) (0.87) (0.98)
Term Spread -0.74 -0.10 0.40 0.45 1.21 -0.84 -0.78 -0.82
(0.83) (0.97) (0.89) (0.88) (0.65) (0.66) (0.63) (0.58)
Net Profit/Total Assets 1.71 2.11 0.09 -1.82 1.19 -2.17 -1.83 1.52
(0.71) (0.67) (0.98) (0.63) (0.73) (0.34) (0.32) (0.24)
EBITD/Total Assets -15.54 ** -7.74 -5.31 -2.69 -5.01 0.66 0.58 -2.47
(0.02) (0.21) (0.31) (0.53) (0.23) (0.78) (0.77) (0.13)
Total Assets/Total Liabilities 0.76 0.42 0.34 0.47 0.44 0.46 0.68 * 0.39
(0.17) (0.44) (0.53) (0.36) (0.33) (0.27) (0.07) (0.22)
MV/Total Liabilities -3.49 -1.53 -0.89 0.28 -0.13 0.47 -0.76 -0.66
(0.22) (0.47) (0.64) (0.84) (0.92) (0.69) (0.38) (0.27)
EBIT/Interest Expenditure 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
(0.90) (0.60) (0.50) (0.47) (0.52) (0.38) (0.46) (0.48)
CA/CL -1.08 * -0.54 -0.43 -0.46 -0.55 * -0.11 -0.09 -0.12
(0.08) (0.21) (0.30) (0.26) (0.08) (0.25) (0.36) (0.23)
MV/Total Assets 0.17 0.37 -0.03 -0.66 0.10 -0.55 -0.26 0.63
(0.91) (0.82) (0.98) (0.61) (0.94) (0.55) (0.74) (0.35)
ln(MV) -0.23 -0.14 -0.36 -0.38 -0.20 -0.41 -0.22 -0.21
(0.56) (0.70) (0.26) (0.23) (0.52) (0.13) (0.29) (0.26)
ln(Total Assets) -0.20 -0.26 -0.12 -0.07 -0.17 0.02 0.00 -0.02
(0.62) (0.48) (0.71) (0.82) (0.57) (0.96) (1.00) (0.93)
Observations 59 69 74 76 82 93 109 125
(59) (69) (74) (76) (81) (91) (106) (122)
 
 
** significant at 5%, * significant at 10%. 
Coefficient estimates (with p-values in parentheses) for the eleven covariates proposed by Partington et al. (2001). PRST represents the sample of 59 firms examined by 
Partington et al. (2001) spanning the period 1984-1993. Data was added to the sample on a yearly basis. The remaining columns are labelled according to the period covered 
by the sample. The number of observations in each sample is noted (with the number of observations with complete data in parentheses). Default Spread is the Moody’s BAA 
Corporate Bond Rate less the Treasury Bond Rate; Term Spread is the Treasury Bond rate less the Treasury Bill rate; Net Profit/Total Assets is the firm’s net profit divided by 
its total assets; EBITD/Total Assets is the firm’s earnings before interest, tax and depreciation divided by its total assets; Total Assets/Total Liabilities is the ratio of the firm’s 
total assets to its total liabilities; MV/Total Liabilities is the ratio of the firm’s market capitalisation to its total liabilities; EBIT/Interest Expense is the firm’s earnings before 
interest and tax divided by its interest expense; CA/CL is the ratio of the firm’s current assets to its current liabilities; MV/Total Assets is the ratio of the firm’s market 
capitalisation to its total assets; ln(MV) is the natural log of the firm’s market capitalisation; ln(Total Assets) is the natural log of the firm’s total assets. Default Spread and 
Term Spread were measured monthly for duration of the firm’s Chapter 11 proceedings; all other covariates were measured prior to the firm’s entry into Chapter 11. 
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Appendix G: 
Model 3: Calendar-time (six-variable) model (using Net Profit/Total Assets) 
 
PRST 1984-1993 1984-1994 1984-1995 1984-1996 1984-1997 1984-1998 1984-1999
Default Spread -6.01 -7.81 -7.61 -7.55 -4.49 -6.94 -1.22 -0.06
(0.46) (0.31) (0.32) (0.32) (0.48) (0.12) (0.72) (0.98)
Net Profit/Total Assets -4.29 ** -2.97 ** -3.29 ** -2.92 ** -1.64 -1.16 ** -0.90 * -0.21
(0.05) (0.04) (0.02) (0.04) (0.19) (0.03) (0.05) (0.43)
EBIT/Interest Expenditure 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
(0.61) (0.58) (0.50) (0.52) (0.53) (0.49) (0.60) (0.58)
CA/CL -0.42 -0.20 -0.18 -0.16 -0.19 -0.09 -0.08 -0.09
(0.28) (0.54) (0.58) (0.61) (0.37) (0.28) (0.40) (0.30)
MV/Total Assets -1.60 ** -0.96 * -1.02 * -0.88 -0.51 -0.32 -0.46 -0.08
(0.03) (0.08) (0.06) (0.10) (0.31) (0.42) (0.28) (0.81)
ln(MV) -0.44 ** -0.37 -0.47 ** -0.43 ** -0.36 ** -0.38 ** -0.25 ** -0.21 **
(0.04) (0.05) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.03) (0.05)
Observations 59 69 74 76 82 93 109 125
(59) (69) (74) (76) (81) (92) (106) (122)
 
 
** significant at 5%, * significant at 10%. 
Coefficient estimates (with p-values in parentheses) for the covariates in the six-variable model. PRST represents the sample of 59 firms examined by Partington et al. (2001) 
spanning the period 1984-1993. Data was added to the sample on a yearly basis. The remaining columns are labelled according to the period covered by the sample. The 
number of observations in each sample is noted (with the number of observations with complete data in parentheses). Default Spread is the Moody’s BAA Corporate Bond 
Rate less the Treasury Bond Rate; Net Profit/Total Assets is the firm’s net profit divided by its total assets; EBIT/Interest Expense is the firm’s earnings before interest and tax 
divided by its interest expense; CA/CL is the ratio of the firm’s current assets to its current liabilities; MV/Total Assets is the ratio of the firm’s market capitalisation to its 
total assets; ln(MV) is the natural log of the firm’s market capitalisation. Default Spread was measured monthly for duration of the firm’s Chapter 11 proceedings: all other 
covariates were measured prior to the firm’s entry into Chapter 11. 
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Appendix H: 
Conventional proportional hazards model with Recession indicator 
 
PRST 1984-1993 1984-1994 1984-1995 1984-1996 1984-1997 1984-1998 1984-1999
Default Spread -2.01 ** -1.35 ** -1.60 ** -1.37 ** -1.49 ** -1.45 ** -1.09 ** -0.77 **
(0.01) (0.04) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02)
EBITD/Total Assets -9.78 ** -4.08 ** -2.93 * -3.78 ** -2.86 ** -0.96 ** -1.02 ** -0.61 **
(0.00) (0.02) (0.08) (0.01) (0.03) (0.02) (0.00) (0.02)
ln(MV) -0.52 ** -0.56 ** -0.50 ** -0.53 ** -0.49 ** -0.41 ** -0.35 ** -0.32 **
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Recession -0.49 -0.75 -0.70 -0.69 -0.60 -0.36 -0.49 -0.67 *
(0.32) (0.11) (0.13) (0.13) (0.17) (0.39) (0.20) (0.07)
Observations 59 69 74 76 82 93 109 125
 
 
Appendix I: 
Conventional proportional hazards model with Post-1990 indicator 
 
PRST 1984-1993 1984-1994 1984-1995 1984-1996 1984-1997 1984-1998 1984-1999
Default Spread -2.51 ** -1.97 ** -2.19 ** -1.92 ** -2.04 ** -1.76 ** -1.21 ** -0.75 **
(0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.04)
EBITD/Total Assets -9.83 ** -3.10 * -2.12 -2.95 ** -2.38 * -0.93 ** -1.00 ** -0.59 **
(0.00) (0.06) (0.17) (0.04) (0.06) (0.03) (0.01) (0.03)
ln(MV) -0.50 ** -0.52 ** -0.47 ** -0.51 ** -0.47 ** -0.40 ** -0.33 ** -0.29 **
(0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Post-1990 -0.27 -0.29 -0.28 -0.24 -0.25 -0.12 0.22 0.59
(0.65) (0.60) (0.61) (0.65) (0.63) (0.82) (0.65) (0.21)
Observations 59 69 74 76 82 93 109 125
 
 
** significant at 5%, * significant at 10%. 
Coefficient estimates (with p-values in parentheses) for the covariates in the three-variable model with a Date-of-Filing indicator. PRST represents the sample of 59 firms 
examined by Partington et al. (2001) spanning the period 1984-1993. Data was added to the sample on a yearly basis. The remaining columns are labelled according to the 
period covered by the sample. The number of observations in each sample is noted. Default Spread is the Moody’s BAA Corporate Bond Rate less the Treasury Bond Rate; 
EBITD/Total Assets is the firm’s earnings before interest, tax and depreciation divided by its total assets; ln(MV) is the natural log of the firm’s market capitalisation; 
Recession takes a value of one if the firm filed for Chapter 11 between July 1990 and March 1991 and zero otherwise; Post-1990 takes a value of one if the firm filed for 
Chapter 11 on or after 1 January 1990 and zero otherwise. All covariates were measured prior to the firm’s entry into Chapter 11. 
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Appendix J: 
Changing percentage of failures through time 
 
Observations Failures Censored % Failures % Censored
PRST 59 25 34 42.37% 57.63%
1984-1993 69 29 40 42.03% 57.97%
1984-1994 74 31 43 41.89% 58.11%
1984-1995 76 33 43 43.42% 56.58%
1984-1996 82 37 45 45.12% 54.88%
1984-1997 93 47 46 50.54% 49.46%
1984-1998 109 57 52 52.29% 47.71%
1984-1999 125 67 58 53.60% 46.40%
 
 
Comparison of the percentage of failures throughout the sample period. Failure is defined as an exit from 
Chapter 11 with no value for existing shareholders. All other observations are censored. PRST represents 
the sample of 59 firms examined by Partington et al. (2001) spanning the period 1984-1993. Data was 
added to the sample on a yearly basis. The remaining rows are labelled according to the period covered by 
the sample. 
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Appendix K: 
Residual analysis 
 
Residuals vs Date-of-Filing
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The Date-of-Filing indicator (the number of days between the firm’s Chapter 11 filing date and 1 January 
1984) was regressed against Default Spread, EBITD/Total Assets and loge(Market Value). The residuals 
from that regression were plotted against the Date-of-Filing indicator. 
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Appendix L: 
Calendar-time model with industry and risk indicators (EBITD/Total Assets outliers retained) 
 
PRST 1984-1993 1984-1994 1984-1995 1984-1996 1984-1997 1984-1998 1984-1999
EBITD/Total Assets -14.19 ** -6.38 ** -6.29 ** -5.99 ** -3.39 ** -1.91 ** -1.46 ** -0.59 *
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.05) (0.00) (0.00) (0.06)
ln(MV) -0.77 ** -0.80 ** -0.84 ** -0.81 ** -0.64 ** -0.56 ** -0.38 ** -0.27 **
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01)
Date-of-Filing 0.00 ** 0.00 ** 0.00 ** 0.00 ** 0.00 ** 0.00 ** 0.00 ** 0.00 **
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01)
HH -0.42 1.24 1.18 1.17 1.33 * 1.48 ** 1.37 ** 1.22 **
(0.77) (0.19) (0.22) (0.22) (0.07) (0.03) (0.04) (0.03)
Transport 1.00 1.83 ** 1.67 ** 1.65 ** 1.29 * 1.60 ** 1.09 ** 0.73
(0.25) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.06) (0.00) (0.04) (0.15)
Wholesale and Retail 1.34 ** 1.50 ** 1.29 ** 1.22 ** 0.59 0.40 0.43 0.23
(0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.19) (0.33) (0.22) (0.45)
Observations 59 69 74 76 82 93 109 125
 
 
** significant at 5%, * significant at 10%. 
Coefficient estimates (with p-values in parentheses) for the covariates in a model containing liquidity and solvency risk interaction indicators. PRST represents the sample of 
59 firms examined by Partington et al. (2001) spanning the period 1984-1993. Data was added to the sample on a yearly basis. The remaining columns are labelled according 
to the period covered by the sample. The number of observations in each sample is noted. Default Spread is the Moody’s BAA Corporate Bond Rate less the Treasury Bond 
Rate; EBITD/Total Assets is the firm’s earnings before interest, tax and depreciation divided by its total assets; ln(MV) is the natural log of the firm’s market capitalisation; 
Date-of-Filing is the number of days between the firm’s Chapter 11 filing date and 1 January 1984; HH has a value of one if the firm has high solvency risk and high liquidity 
risk and zero otherwise; HL has a value of one if the firm has high solvency risk and low liquidity risk and zero otherwise; LH has a value of one if the firm has low solvency 
risk and high liquidity risk and zero otherwise; Transport has a value of one if the firm has a SIC code of 4000-4899 and zero otherwise; Wholesale and Retail has a value of 
one if the firm has SIC code of 5000-5999 and zero otherwise. In each sub-sample, a firm has high solvency risk if its EBIT/Interest Expense is less than the median value 
and high liquidity risk if its CA/CL is less than the median value. Default Spread was measured monthly for duration of the firm’s Chapter 11 proceedings; all other 
covariates were measured prior to the firm’s entry into Chapter 11. 
 
 
